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INTRODUCTION
Proponents of takings bills rely on two unfounded claims: that
"takings" bills will protect private property and that such bills
track the Constitution's Fifth Amendment clause, "nor shall pri-
vate property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."1
* Counsel, Office of Federal and International Affairs, National
Wildlife Federation, 1400 16th Street, N.W., Suite 501, Washington,
D.C. 20036-2266 (202) 797-6865; sugameli@nwf.org. Portions of this arti-
cle are adapted from Glenn P. Sugameli, Environmentalism: The Real
Movement to Protect Property Rights, in A WOLF IN THE GARDEN: THE LAND
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL DEBATE 59 (Philip D.
Brick & R. McGreggor Cawley eds., 1996) [hereinafter Sugameli, En-
vironmentalism]; and Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 12 VA. ENvTL. LJ. 439 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas], which was reproduced in
the 1994 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK (Kenneth Young ed.);
excerpted in the LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE casebook (Curtis Berger &
Joan Williams eds., 4th ed. 1997), and will be reprinted in the three
volume set ENVIRONMENT, PROPERTY AND THE LAW (Ronald L. Rosenberg
ed., forthcoming 1998).
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V. For example, Senate Committee on the
Judiciary Chairman Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah), in his opening statement
at a Committee hearing on S. 605, the unsuccessful Omnibus Property
Rights Act of 1995, declared that:
excesses in land use regulations collectivize property by prohib-
iting the owners of their property the ability to use productively
their property. S. 605 was written to fulfill the promise of the
fifth amendment that no property shall be taken by the Gov-
ernment except for public use and with just compensation to
the property owner .... It codifies recent Supreme Court deci-
sions and clarifies the meaning of sometimes confusing case
law.
The Right To Own Property: Hearings on S. 605 Before the Comm. on
the Judiciary of the Senate, 104th Cong. 139 (1995) [hereinafter S.
Hrg. 104-535] (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch). As described
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In fact, as this article demonstrates, takings bills would harm
property and other rights of average Americans because they
would radically redefine property rights by using standards that
are contrary to the Fifth Amendment's balanced approach. 2 It is
not unconstitutional for Congress to require payments to compa-
nies and developers who have not lost any property rights under
established Supreme Court jurisprudence. The result, however,
should be recognized for what it is - a new entitlement that
would impose massive costs on taxpayers, trigger a litigation ex-
plosion, generate more bureaucracy and cause an inability to en-
force protections for people, private property and public re-
sources. Takings bills would create a right in developers, factories
and others to be bad neighbors: extracting profits at the expense
of nearby people, property, and the environment. Nearly every-
one lives, works or recreates downstream, downwind, or nearby
property on which harmful activities would be allowed.
Since 1990, the author3 and others at the National Wildlife
Federation (NWF), 4 the nation's largest membership-supported
conservation organization, have been in the forefront of the
below, overwhelming evidence was presented at Senate Judiciary
Committee hearings that the bill contradicted unanimous, estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent. Subsequently, Sen. Hatch es-
sentially repeated his assertion in describing a slightly revised bill
that tracked the S. 605 standards. See 142 CONG. REc. S7888 (daily
ed. July 16, 1996).
2. SeeJohn A. Humbach, Should Taxpayers Pay People to Obey Environ-
mental Laws?, 6 FORDHAM ENvrL. LJ. 423 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, A
Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENvrtL. L.J 409
(1995); Sugameli, Environmentalism, supra note *, at 59.
3. See, e.g., articles by the author cited supra note *. See also Courts
Reject Wetland Takings Claims, NAT'L WETLANDS NEWSL. (Envtl. L. Inst.
1994); Species Protection and Fifth Amendment Takings of Private Property, in
TRANSACTIONS OF THE SIXTIETH NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND NATuRAL
RESOURCES CONFERENCE (Kelly G. Wadsworth & Richard E. McCabe eds.,
Wildlife Management Inst. 1995); Colloquium, The Fifth Amendment's
Just Compensation Clause: Implications for Regulatory Policy, 6 ADMIN. L.J
AM. U. 674 (1993) (Sugameli cmts.); Glenn P. Sugameli, A Most Extreme
Takings Bill, WASH. POsT, Dec. 3, 1995 (letter to the editor).
4. See, e.g., Editorial, Balancing Private Rights and Public Well-Being,
NAT'L WILDLIFE, Oct.-Nov. 1994, at 3; Doug Harbrecht, A Question of
Property Rights and Wrongs, NAT'L WILDLIFE, Oct.-Nov. 1994, at 4.
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broad coalition opposed to state and federal takings bills. NWF
and others who oppose takings bills are the genuine private
property protection movement, not the self-styled "property
rights" advocates. NWF strongly supports the Fifth Amendment's
balanced protection of private property. If a court determines
that a government limit on the use of private property goes so
far as to be a taking, just compensation must be paid.' NWF op-
poses takings bills because they threaten a wide range of protec-
tions of private property, people and public resources which do
not take private property rights. As discussed below, takings bills
would delay, block, or be so prohibitively expensive as to force
repeal of these protections.
Takings bills are a reaction to environmental, zoning, health,
safety and other laws that restrain inappropriate uses of private
property.6 For example, pollution control laws were enacted be-
cause common law nuisance doctrine was inadequate to protect
people and property. Passage of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA) 7 was prompted by the col-
lapse of a massive coal company waste refuse pile which had
dammed a stream. 8 The resulting 20-to-30-foot tidal wave killed
more than 125 people and destroyed 1,000 homes.9
5. In contrast with a physical taking where the government physi-
cally appropriates or invades private property, a regulatory taking refers
to the constitutional principle that the government can "take" private
property by severely restricting its use through regulation, thus, requir-
ing payment to the property owner.
6. See, e.g., Nancie G. Marzulla, Pmperty Rights Movement: How It Be-
gan and Where It is Headed [hereinafter Nancie G. Marzulla, Property
Rights Movement], in A WoLF IN THE GARDEN, supra note *, at 39.
7. Pub. L. No. 95-87, 30 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
8. See generally Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n,
Inc., et al. v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Va. 1980); Bruce Babbitt
[Secretary of the Interior] & Robert Uram [Dir., Off. of Surface Min-
ing Reclamation & Enforcement], GOP Bill Puts King Coal Back on
Throne, CHARLESTON GAZETTE (W. Va.), July 17, 1996, at 5A ("Buffalo
Creek was one of the worst manmade disasters in U.S. history. More
than any other event, Buffalo Creek led to the passage of the surface
mining law by showing that control of surface coal mining operations
is a matter of life and death, not mere landscape aesthetics.").
9. See Gerald M. Stern, Prologue to THE BuFFALo CREEK DISASTER ix-
x (Vintage Books 1976).
1997]
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Much of the concern behind takings bills is based on a mis-
conception that the Constitution's Takings Clause was drafted to
reflect a situation in which the government regulated private
property minimally, if at all.10 Under the guise of protecting
property rights, however, takings bills actually contradict funda-
mental principles that have been repeatedly reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court." Takings bills favor profits at the expense of
homeowners and the public, essentially reversing established
law.12 Under the Court's approach of balancing the property and
other rights of all affected people, very few conservation laws re-
sult in takings. For example, courts have rejected a series of tak-
ings claims against SMCRA's protection of the safety and prop-
erty of coalfield residents from the devastating effects of strip
mining and underground mining.13 These included a sweeping
takings claim against SMCRA's prohibition of coal mining in
buffer zones around cemeteries, historic sites, homes, and other
sensitive areas. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the
law had taken the coal that could not be mined.1 4
Part I of this article discusses the origin and structure of vari-
ous takings bills. Part II considers takings bills in light of long-
10. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-239, at 13. For a refutation of this mis-
conception, see John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Significance for
Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 Hav. L. REv. 1252 (1996). See also James M.
McElfish, Jr., Property Rights, Prperty Roots: Rediscovering the Basis for Legal
Protection of the Environment, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,231
(1994).
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. While takings bills would not change the standard for deter-
mining whether property has been taken under the Constitution, they
would alter the results of cases that have found no taking. Takings bills
would require payments under a new entitlement in cases where courts
have found that no property rights have been taken.
13. See, e.g., Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981).
14. See id. at 329 ("Congress adopted [SMCRA] in order to insure
that production of coal for interstate commerce would not be at the
expense of agriculture, the environment, or public health and safety..
• ."). See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 488 (1987) (rejecting takings challenge to Pennsylvania law requir-
ing that 50% of the coal be left in place under protected homes to
prevent collapse and "to protect the public interest in health, the envi-
ronment, and the fiscal integrity of the area").
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standing legal precedents. Part III demonstrates how enactment
of these bills would seriously undermine important protections
for people, property and the environment.
I. TAKINGS BILLS
A. Origin of Takings Bills
The concept of a duty to avoid takings is fueled in part by
rhetoric regarding alleged "unconstitutional" takings. In this re-
gard, it is important to recognize that the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause does not prohibit takings of private property for pub-
lic use; it only requires that just compensation be available
through the courts where such a taking is found to have oc-
curred. "[S]o long as compensation is available for those whose
property is in fact taken, the governmental action is not uncon-
stitutional." 15 Where compensation is available, as it is generally
against the United States under the Tucker Act, 16 monetary pay-
ments obtainable through Tucker Act suits, not injunctive relief,
constitute the remedy for an alleged "constitutional taking" of
private property for public use.17
1 15. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
128 (1985).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1994).
17. Preseault v. ICC, 494 U.S. 1, 11 (1990). The Ninth Circuit re-
jected an argument that a statutory amendment "amounts to a taking
and therefore is unconstitutional .... Because appellants can sue the
United States in the Court of Federal Claims, the 1995 Amendment is
not an uncompensated taking. We therefore have no basis for holding
[the amendment] invalid as appellants suggest." Bay View, Inc. v.
Ahtna, Inc., 105 E3d 1281, 1284-85 (9th Cir. 1997). This opinion was
written by Judge Kozinski, who was formerly Chief Judge of the trial-
level United States Claims Court, since renamed the United States
Court of Federal Claims. Thus, a question of an "unconstitutional" tak-
ing only arises in one of two very rare situations. The first is a taking
that is not for public use. As the Bay View court recognized: "After Ha-
waii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984), . . . a legislative de-
termination of what constitutes 'public use' is subject to 'an extremely
narrow' review, and will be upheld so long as it's rational." Id. at 1286
(citing 467 U.S. at 240, 243). Second, the legislature could explicitly
preclude a monetary remedy. See id. at 1285 ("the availability of a
Tucker Act remedy is presumed unless Congress in enacting a specific
19971 525
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Much of the pro-takings bill rhetoric consists of argument by
mythical anecdote. Prominent takings bill advocates often misin-
terpret court rulings. 8 Proponents of takings bills have also re-
peatedly failed to substantiate their assertions of widespread tak-
ings.19 This is especially true of assertions that widespread takings
of property rights result from conservation and other laws that
protect private property, public health and safety by limiting de-
struction of wetlands, floodplains and other natural resources.
statute has 'withdrawn the Tucker Act.' " (quoting Regional Rail Reor-
ganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102 (1974)).
18. For example, according to her new book, "Nancie G. Marzulla
is the nationally recognized leader of the property rights movement."
Nancie G. Marzulla & Roger J. Marzulla, PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTAND-
ING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION xvii (1997).
She has repeatedly stated or implied that the First English and Florida
Rock cases found takings. See Nancie G. Marzulla, The Property Rights
Movement, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990S' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION 15
(Bruce Yandle ed., 1995) ("In the First English decision, the Court held
that the county was required to compensate a church barred by a flood
control ordinance from reconstructing summer camp buildings de-
stroyed during a 1978 flood."). See also Nancie G. Marzulla, Property
Rights Movement, supra note 6, at 46-47; Nancie G. Marzulla, State Private
Property Rights Initiatives as a Response to Environmental Takings' in REGU-
LATORY TAKINGS: RESTORING PRIVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS 87, 98 (Roger
Clegg ed., 1994) [hereinafter Marzulla, State Rights]. In First English, the
Supreme Court declined to decide whether barring reconstruction of a
summer camp destroyed by a flood was a taking. See First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987)
(focusing on appropriate remedy in cases where a taking is found).
Subsequently, the state court decision on remand found no takings,
210 Cal..App. 3d 1353, 1372-73 (1989), a decision the Court let stand,
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). In Florida Rock, the Supreme Court
denied the company's petition to review the Federal Circuit's decision
which vacated a trial level finding of a taking. Florida Rock Indus. v.
United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
898 (1995).
19. See Michael Allan Wolf, Overtaking the Fifth Amendment: The Leg-
islative Backlash Against Environmentalism, 6 FORDHAm ENVTL. LJ. 637
(1995) (rebutting hyperbolic arguments and horror stories of private
property proponents); see also Patrick A. Parenteau, Who's Taking What?
Property Rights, Endangered Species, and the Constitution, 6 FoRDHAM ENVTL.
LJ. 619 (1995).
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For example, in the 1996 Vice Presidential candidate debate,
Republican nominee Jack Kemp spoke vaguely of an unnamed
Oregon farmer who allegedly had voluntarily declared 25 per-
cent of his property to be wetlands and then found that
[T]he bald eagle began to use it as a habitat. The Corps of En-
gineers, the Bureau of Wildlife and Fisheries [sic], all of the
federal agencies came onto his property, declared it a federal
wetland and said he couldn't drive. They took away the road.
He couldn't mend his fences. And they wouldn't pay the value
of the loss .... 20
Attempts to locate the source of this story were unsuccessful. 21
These anecdotes appear to be versions of what a court de-
scribed in a different context:
[T]he "urban legends" that Jan Harold Brunvand writes about
in "The Vanishing Hitchhiker," and "Cursesl Broiled Again!"
(1989). According to Brunvand, a distinguishing feature of an
urban legend is that no one is ever able to produce an eyewit-
ness to the actual event - only a "friend of a friend." Another
is that the stories crop up over and over again, in many differ-
ent settings.2
In fact, wetlands, species protection and other conservation
laws are extremely unlikely to take private property. For example,
in the over 20 year history of the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
courts have only decided four Fifth Amendment takings cases on
the merits, all of which have found that the ESA did not take
private property.23 In Fiscal Year 1995, there were over 62,000 wet-
20. Campaign '96: Transcript of the Vice Presidential Debate, WASH.
PosT, Oct. 10, 1996, at A25.
21. See Al Kamen, Next Time, Perhaps, a Shorter Speech, WASH. PosT,
Oct. 23, 1996, at A21. The Fish and Wildlife Service and the Demo-
cratic National Committee checked, but "no one has been able to find
anything in their files that remotely resembles this incident." Id.
22. Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
Stop Treaty Abuse-Wisconsin, Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1385, 1394 n.7 (W.D.
Wis. 1992), modified on other grounds, 991 F2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1993).
23. Christy v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1324, 1335 (9th Cir. 1988) (rancher
fined for killing grizzly bears that were eating sheep); United States v.
Kepler, 531 F2d 796 (6th Cir. 1976) (ban on interstate or foreign trans-
port of endangered species as applied to species lawfully possessed
before passage of the ESA); United States v. Hill, 896 E Supp. 1057 (D.
Colo. 1995) (no taking from ESA prohibition on sale of animal parts;
defendant was not denied all value as other uses remained, defendant
1997]
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lands section 404 permit applications, yet only 274 (or 0.5 per-
cent) of the permits were denied.2 4 Even in the rare cases where
permits are denied, there is no limitation on use of upland por-
tions of property or on grazing, agricultural or other uses of wet-
land areas for which a permit is not required.
Until recently, takings legislation has generally assumed two
forms: (1) so-called "compensation" or "payment" bills, and (2)
"assessment" bills.25
Payment bills purport to compensate property owners whose
property has been "taken" through use restrictions. The term
"compensation bill," however, is a misnomer. "Compensation"
means payment for something that has been lost or taken. These
bills do not offer "compensation" for property that has been
taken. In fact, these bills would use funds from federal, state or
local taxpayers to pay property owners who have not lost any
property rights, according to every Justice of the Supreme Court.
Thus, as demonstrated below, payment bills would pay develop-
ers, factory owners and others to obey laws that protect the
rights of all Americans.
Assessment bills are typically based on an impossible premise.
They require that each regulating agency perform costly studies
to make a takings determination and a dollar assessment when
any regulation is proposed. Such a requirement is inconsistent
with Supreme Court rulings and would generate costly and ob-
structive red tape that can block or delay needed protections for
people and property.26
The fact that takings bills would undermine fundamental pro-
tections for people, property and the environment is indicated
by the origins and history of the self-proclaimed "property
had never applied for an ESA sale permit and defendant had no prop-
erty right in animal parts he obtained after they were subject to ESA
proscriptions); Good v. United States, 39 Fed. Cl. 81 (1997), appeal
pending. See also Four Points Utility Joint Venture v. United States, 40
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1509, 1511 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (takings claim was
not ripe because plaintiffs failed to apply for an ESA section 10(a) inci-
dental take permit).
24. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, FISCAL YEAR 1995 REGULA-
TORY PROGRAMS STATISTICS (Nov. 8, 1995).
25. SeeJ. Peter Byme, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89, 137 (1995) [hereinafter Byrne, Ten
Arguments].
26. See infra Part II.A.
TAKINGS BILLS
rights" movement. Former Solicitor General Charles Fried (1985-
89) described the approach of the Reagan Administration's De-
partment of Justice as:
[a] specific, aggressive, and, it seemed to me, quite radical pro-
ject.., to use the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a
severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and
property. The grand plan was to make government pay com-
pensation as for a taking of property every time its regulations
impinged too severely on a property right .... [T]here would
be, to say the least, much less regulation.2 7
Government compensation for actual takings of property is re-
quired by the Fifth Amendment. What Fried termed the "radi-
cal" agenda of the Reagan Justice Department, however, would
have required compensation or forced the repeal of regulations,
not only for actual takings, but in thousands of other instances
"as for a taking."28
This agenda was embodied in President Reagan's Executive
Order 12,630.29 The Order requires that all federal regulations
be approved under a takings test which, as the Congressional Re-
search Service and others have demonstrated, severely misrepre-
sents Supreme Court rulings.30 The primary authors of the Exec-
27. CHARLES FRID, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLU-
TION: A FIRSTHAND AccouNT 183 (1991) (emphasis added).
28. Id. (emphasis added).
29. Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (1988).
30. See Congressional Research Service, Comparison of Taking
Principles In Executive Order No. 12,630 with Supreme Court Taking
Jurisprudence, and Related Questions, CRS-6 (released memorandum
Dec. 15, 1988); Kirsten Engel, Taking Risks: Executive Order 12,630 and
Environmental Health and Safety Regulation, 14 VT. L. REv. 213 (1989);
Robin E. Folsom, Executive Order 12,630: A President's Manipulation of the
Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause to Achieve Control Over Executive
Agency Regulatory Decisionmaking, 20 B.C. ENVL. AFF. L. REv. 639 (1993);
Jerry Jackson & Lyle D. Albaugh, A Critique of the Takings Executive Order
in the Context of Environmental Regulation, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,463 (1988); James M. McElfish, Jr., The Takings Executive Order:
Constitutional Jurisprudence or Political Philosophy?, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,474, 10,476 (1988); Robert Meltz, Federal Regulation of
the Environment and the Taking Issue, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 95 (1990);
Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Pmpositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 265, 288, 291 (1996)
[hereinafter Rose, A Dozen Propositions]; Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light
of Lucas, supra note *, at 443-45; Charles R. Wise, The Changing Doctrine
1997]
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utive Order were Mark Pollot and Roger Marzulla,3 1 who have
since left the Justice Department and pursued careers as zealous
pro-takings advocates.32
In 1991, the United States Office of Surface Mining (OSM)
proposed a rule33 that relied on the flawed Executive Order to
allow coal companies to destroy homes and other sensitive areas.
In effect, the rule would have nullified the congressional protec-
tion afforded by SMCRA section 522(e) for sensitive national
lands and private property34 by defining the statutory exception
for "valid existing rights" of coal companies contrary to the
rights of surface private property owners and the public.35 OSM
of Regulatory Taking and the Executive Branch: Will Taking Impact Analysis
Enhance or Damage the Federal Government's Ability to Regulate?, 44 ADMIN.
L. REV. 403, 426 (1992).
31. See MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFr AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN AMERICA 161 (1993); Roger J. Marzulla, The New "Takings" Ex-
ecutive Order and Environmental Regulation - Collision or Cooperation?, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,254 (July 1988).
32. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 59-60, 70-78 (testimony of
Roger Marzulla); Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 33, 87
(1996) [hereinafter S. Hrg. 104-299] (statement and testimony of Roger
Marzulla); Marianne Lavelle, The "Pmperty Rights" Revolt: Environmental-
ists Fret as States Pass Reagan-Style Takings Laws, NAT'L LJ., May 10, 1993,
at 1, reprinted in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 36, 3940 (John Echeverria & Raymond Booth
Ely eds., 1995) (Mark Pollot "has drafted a new, stronger proposed tak-
ings law .... The idea is that a property owner should be able auto-
matically to obtain compensation if he or she can show that his or her
land lost 50 percent of its value as the result of a new zoning law, or
wetlands regulation, wildlife habitat preservation plan, or other regula-
tion."); Debate, Taking "Takings Rights" Seriously: A Debate on Property
Rights Legislation Before the 104th Congress, 9 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 253
(1995) [hereinafter "Takings Rights" Debate].
33. 56 Fed. Reg. 33,152-65 (1991). The author submitted extensive
comments opposing OSM's proposal on behalf of the National Wildlife
Federation and other citizen and environmental groups.
34. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e) (1988), protects these ar-
eas, subject to "valid existing rights," which the Act does not define.
35. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470, 488 (1987) (upholding Pennsylvania's power "to protect the public
interest in health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the
area"); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 329 (1981) ("Congress adopted
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proposed to open to strip mining areas including National Parks
and the nation's backyards, schoolyards, churchyards and
graveyards.
OSM's proposed rule also reaffirmed a 1988 Interior Depart-
ment Statement of Policy 36 which effectively confirmed that the
Reagan Administration agenda was motivated by concern for de-
velopment interests like the -coal industry, not by a concern for
the property rights of average citizens. 37 The Statement of Policy
declared that if companies initiated action to conduct mining in
National Parks and other federal areas protected under SMCRA
section 522(e) (1), then "subject to appropriation the Secretary
of the Interior [would] use available authorities to seek to ac-
quire such rights through exchange, negotiated purchase or con-
demnation." 8 This policy did not extend to the other subsec-
tions, including SMCRA section 522(e) (5), that protect the
private property and other rights of surface owners in their
homes, schools, churches and cemeteries.3 9
The public rejected this distorted view of property rights.
When the Bush Administration stated its intention to finalize the
OSM rule after the 1992 presidential election, the New York Times
reported on the plan in a widely syndicated front-page article.40
As a result of the firestorm of public and editorial criticism that
[SMCRA] in order to insure that production of coal for interstate com-
merce would not be at the expense of agriculture, the environment, or
public health and safety. ... ").
36. Department Policy Pertaining to the Exercise of Valid Existing
Rights in Areas Covered by section 522(e)(1) of the Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,384 (1988).
37. 56 Fed. Reg. 33,152, 33,154 (proposed July 18, 1991).
38. Id. (citing the 1988 Statement of Policy).
39. By its terms this policy was restricted to § 522(e) (1), and thus
did not address land that is "within three hundred feet from any occu-
pied dwelling .... within three hundred feet of any public building,
school, church, community, or institutional building, public park, or
within one hundred feet of a cemetery." See SMCRA § 522(e)(5), 30
U.S.C. § 1272(e)(5) (1988).
40. See Keith Schneider, U.S. Set to Open National Forests for Strip
Mining, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1992, at Al; see also Boyce Rensberger,
Strip Mining on U.S. Land Debated: Environmentalists Say Interior Dept. Rule
Would Threaten Acreage, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1992, at A10; Keith
Schneider, Public Lands May Be Open for Mining; Bush Administration
Makes Policy Change, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 28, 1992, at Al.
1997]
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followed, 41 the House-Senate conference committee inserted a
provision blocking this rule for one year in the final version of
the Energy Policy Act of 1992.42
B. Early Bills
In 1990, the first legislative takings proposal was offered by
Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho) in the form of an unsuccessful
Floor amendment to the farm bill that would have required cer-
tain types of future regulations to be "in compliance with Execu-
tive Order 12,630 or similar procedures." 43 The next year, Sena-
tor Symms introduced S. 50, the "Private Property Rights Act of
1991," 44 a separate bill that expanded the 1990 Symms amend-
ment to all federal agencies. On June 12, 1991, the Senate ap-
proved S. 50 as a Floor amendment to the surface transportation
bill.45 This takings provision was removed in conference commit-
tee with the House of Representatives, 46 in response to strong op-
position by House Democratic Committee Chairs and by labor,
41. Editorials which criticized the proposed rule included Coal
Cash, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 29, 1992, at 16A; Just Say No to Strip
Miners, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 29, 1992, at A8; Minerals Rights and
Wrongs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 1, 1992, at 28; National Parks:
Bush Is Much Too Willing to Invite in Strip Miners, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Oct. 18, 1992, at 2G; Strip Mining National Parks, S.F. EXAMINER, Sept. 29,
1992, at A16. See also Stripping a National Asset, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 30,
1992, at 16 (prompting an exchange involving the author in the Globe's
"Letters to the Editor" on the takings issue: Richard L. Lawson, Presi-
dent, National Coal Ass'n, Strip Mining Issue Is Not About a Giveaway,
Oct. 10, 1992, and Glenn P. Sugameli, National Wildlife Fed'n, Interior
Strip-Mining Proposal Must Be Blocked, Oct. 23, 1992).
42. See § 2504(b) of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 as reported at
138 CONG. REc. H12,146 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992).
43. See 136 CONG. REC. S10,909-17 (daily ed. July 27, 1990) (the
amendment was tabled by a vote of 52 to 43).
44. See S. 50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). For a description of
1991-92 takings bills, see Robert Meltz, Private Property Protection Legisla-
tion in the 102nd Congress, CRS Issue Brief, Sept. 18, 1992.
45. See 137 CONG. REc. S7542-49, S7552-62 (daily ed. June 12, 1991)
(The amendment passed after a motion to table was defeated 44 to
55).
46. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 404, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 354 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.CAN. 1734.
TAKINGS BILLS
environmental, consumer, historic preservation, planning, civil
rights and other public interest groups.47
Subsequent federal takings bills were even more radical. In
1991, Representative Jimmy Hayes (D-La.) introduced a wetlands
bill with the first takings payment provision. 48 By 1993, there
were a variety of takings proposals and the first Congressional
hearing on a federal takings bill.49
In May, 1993, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) discussed, but did
not offer, his takings assessment bill, S. 177, as an amendment to
the Department of the Environment Act, a proposed bill to ele-
vate EPA to Cabinet level.50 One year later, the Senate approved
a modified version as an amendment to a bill to reauthorize the
Safe Drinking Water Act.5 1 This provision died when the House
failed to move the drinking water bill.
Near the end of the 103rd Congress, takings bill proponents
suffered a setback on the Floor of the House when Representa-
tive W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (D-La.) unsuccessfully attempted to add a
compensation takings amendment to H.R. 5044, the American
Heritage Areas Partnership Program Act of 1994. Under Repre-
sentative Tauzin's amendment the local governments that would
manage these areas would have been required to establish proce-
dures, including "an administrative process to provide compensa-
tion to the owner of private property if the use or value of all or
any portion of the private property is substantially diminished as
a result of the designation of the American Heritage Area or the
management plan for the American Heritage Area."52 An alterna-
tive, bipartisan amendment offered by Representative Nick J..
Rahall II (D-W.Va.) and Representative Ralph Regula (R-Ohio)
only required "a process to provide information to the owners of
private property with respect to obtaining just compensation due
as a result of a taking of private property under the Fifth
47. See Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas, supra note *, at
447 nn.39, 40.
48. HL 1330, 102d Cong. (1991).
49. Private Property Protection Act of 1993, H.R. 561, 103d Cong.
(1993).
50. 139 CONG. REC. S5337-5342 (daily ed. May 4, 1993).
51. 140 CONG. REC. 55989 (daily ed. May 19, 1994).
52. 140 CONG. REC. H10,903 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1994).
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Amendment of the Constitution of the United States."53 After a
spirited debate, the House voted 234 to 187 to reject the Tauzin
amendment in favor of the Rahall-Regula substitute.5 4
C. The "Contract with America" Takings Fight
While opposition to takings bills has always been bipartisan,
supporters made a major push for passage in the wake of the
1994 congressional elections which ushered in Republican con-
trol of the House as well as the Senate. In 1995-96, unsuccessful
federal takings bills would have mandated unlimited payments
from taxpayers to corporations and individuals whose property
has not been taken according to Supreme Court standards.
1. The Private Property Protection Act of 1995, H.R. 925
In the beginning of the 104th Congress, an extraordinarily
broad takings provision was introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives buried in the fine print of the new Republican
House majority's Contract With America as Tide IX of H.R. 9,
the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995.55 The tak-
ings portion of H.R. 9 later was split off as H.R. 925, the Private
Property Protection Act of 1995.56
In one of its earlier versions, H.R. 925 would have required
payment to any corporation, partnership or individual when the
value of the affected portion of their property was, diminished by
10 percent or more as a result of any federal government regula-
tion.57 In the early, heady days of the 104th Congress, the new
House Republican leadership rushed H.R. 925 through the
House. Considering its massive scope and impact, it is remarka-
53. Id.
54. See id. at H10,913 (Roll No. 485).
55. H.K 9, 104th Cong. §§ 9001-9004 (1995). As Professor Sax has
pointed out, the takings provision was "tucked away in just about one
and a half pages of an eighty-two page bill [H.R. 9] entitled the 'Job
Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995,' a provision called Title
IX." Joseph L. Sax, Takings Legislation: Wew It Stands and What Is Next,
23 EcoLoGy L.Q. 509, 509 (1996).
56. H.R 925, 104th Cong. (1995).
57. See H.R. 925, 104th Cong. § 2(a) (version introduced on Feb.
14, 1995).
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ble that there was only one hearing on the bill, which took place
in the subcommittee 58 Rather than mark-up the bill, the subcom-
mittee sent it directly to the full Committee on the Judiciary,
which marked up the bill without further hearings.
In March, 1995, on the Floor of the House, the breathtaking
scope of H.R. 925 was limited for the first time. The House
amended the bill, so that it would have created a new entitle-
ment requiring payments whenever the value of any portion of
land and water rights was diminished by 20 percent or more as a
result of federal laws protecting endangered species and wetlands
and certain laws regarding use of water.59
The full House's rejection of a bipartisan homeowners protec-
tion amendment offered by Representatives Ron Wyden (D-Or.)
and Wayne Gilchrest (R-Md.), was particularly revealing. The
amendment would have added an exception "with respect to an
agency action that would prevent or restrict any activity likely to
diminish the fair market value of any private homes."60 Represen-
tative Wyden argued that the bill would result in increased per-
mits to fill wetlands that would harm downstream property own-
ers. He also argued that the bill was unbalanced: it "sets out a
double standard that treats development interests better than the
typical homeowner. Development interests get compensated if
their property values are merely diminished, but the neighboring
homeowners have to meet a higher standard, requiring physical
damage to their properties for the exemption in the bill to ap-
ply."61 Supporters of the bill opposed the amendment by arguing
58. See Protecting Private Property Rights From Regulatory Takings: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Hearing: Property Rights].
59. See H.R. 925 § 3(a) (version introduced on Mar. 3, 1995); see
also 141 CONG. REc. H2502-04, 2529-30 (Roll No. 190) (daily ed. March
2, 1995). In unsuccessfully opposing this amendment, the ranking
Democrat on the House Resources Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Sub-
committee argued on the Floor that: "The committees of jurisdiction
[over] these two statutes have had no hearings on this. They have not
even had a sequential referral for 1 minute of this bill in this Con-
gress." Id. at H2528 (statement of Rep. Gerry Studds (D-Mass.)).
60. 141 CONG. REc. H2556 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
61. Id. at H2559.
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that injured homeowners could file suits at common law.62
The Judiciary Subcommittee and the full House rejected other
amendments that would have reduced at least a few of the addi-
tional ways in which the bill's standards were contrary to those
governing takings under the Constitution. These included the
subcommittee's rejection of an amendment offered by Represen-
tative Barney Frank (D-Mass.) to "bar an owner from receiving
[payment] under the Act if at the time he acquired the property
he knew or should have known that the property was or would
be limited by an agency action."63
On the Floor, the House rejected, by a vote of 211 to 210, an
amendment offered by Representative Porter Goss (R-Fla.) that
would have changed the standard to require looking at the over-
all property, not just the affected portion (and incidentally to
raise the percentage test from ten percent, as the bill then stood,
to thirty percent). 64 A bipartisan amendment by Representative
62. See id. at H2559-60 (statement of Rep. Fields (R-Tex.)). A con-
temporaneous news account contrasted the views on this vote of bill
supporters and those of the author:
Rep. Charles T. Canady, R-Fla., a co-sponsor of the bill, said
that property owners who are harmed have recourse to local
zoning and nuisance laws. But environmentalists argue that
obtaining such relief is often difficult, if not impossible.
Many states limit citizens' recourse to nuisance law. Some
farm states, for example, don't allow citizens to sue for agri-
cultural runoff. "The irony is that all day long, the bill's
sponsors were talking about the poor developers who have to
go to court to enforce their rights under the Constitution,"
says Glenn Sugameli, counsel to the National Wildlife Feder-
ation, of the March 2-3 debate. "But the homeowners who
suffer because of polluters? they have to go to court."
Marianne Lavelle, Closing the Property Rights Contract: Opponents Say the
Environment and Home Owners Would Lose Under Federal Bills, NAT'L LJ.,
Mar. 27, 1995, at Al.
63. H.R. REP. No. 104-46 at 6 (1995).
64. 141 CONG. REc. H2551-55 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995). As explained
herein, the Supreme Court has unanimously rejected any percentage
test for a taking. Therefore, the attempted change from 10% to 30%,
like the change that was later agreed to on the Floor from 10% to 20%
of the value of the affected portion, does not alter the bill's inconsis-
tency with the Constitutional standard.
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Davis (R-Va.) and Representative Mineta (D-Cal.) was then of-
fered to change the standard to twenty percent of the overall
property.6 In the face of the sponsors' repeated offer to have an
immediate vote, the House Republican leadership recessed the
House.66 By the next morning, the leadership had whipped the
issue and regrouped. The amendment was defeated 252 to 173,
followed immediately by a 338 to 83 vote in favor of a leadership-
endorsed amendment to change the standard from ten percent
of the affected portion to twenty percent of the affected
portion.67
On March 3, 1995, the House passed H.R. 92568 (and then im-
mediately recombined it with the rest of H.R. 9).
Supporters of takings bills focus heavily on alleged tales of
small property owners who suffer from takings. As Representative
Sam Farr (D-Cal.), stated in debate on H.R. 925, however:
Who are the special interests supporting this? The National
Mining Association, the Chemical Manufacturers Association,
the National Association of Manufacturers, the American Petro-
leum Institute, the American Independent Refiners Association,
American Forest and Paper Association, and International
Council of Shopping Centers. Those do not sound like small
landowners to me.69
No federal or state takings bill that has been introduced has
been limited in any way to small property owners or even to real
people as opposed to corporations. The Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause, of course, applies to all property owners. Takings
bills like H.R. 925, however, establish a new entitlement for those
who have not lost any property rights, and thus, the omission of
any limitation offers an insight into the intention of the
sponsors.
2. The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995, S. 605
On March 23, 1995, Senate Majority Leader and 1996 Republi-
can Presidential candidate, Robert Dole (R-Kan.), introduced S.
65. Id. at H2562-66.
66. Id.
67. 141 CONG. REc. H2590-98 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995).
68. Id. at H2606-07.
69. 141 CONG. REc. H2532 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 1995).
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605 with 31 original cosponsors.70 The bill began and ended as a
sweeping payment and assessment bill. It covered all types of
property, as well as actions or inactions by federal agencies, and
actions by state agencies carrying out regulatory programs under
any federal law. The bill would have required federal taxpayers
to pay for any regulatory action that reduces by one-third or
more the speculative value of any affected portion of a real, per-
sonal or intangible piece of property.
The Dole bill was "really a blend of four legislative proposals
that were floated during the 103rd Congress." 71 These included
"Dole's proposal to require federal agencies to conduct a 'tak-
ings' analysis before issuing any new regulations," and "A mea-
sure by Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), requiring the federal gov-
ernment to compensate property owners when any government
action reduces the value of their property."72
At the time Senator Dole introduced S. 605, he and Senator
Gramm were major rival contenders for the Republican Presiden-
tial nomination. In this context, Senator Dole's bill can be seen
in part as a political effort to forestall any attempt by Senator
Gramm to make a "property rights" appeal to right-wing Repub-
lican primary and caucus voters. As the New York Times reported
on May 15, 1995:
Senator Phil Gramm of Texas has made property rights one of
the items in his campaign for the 1996 Republican Presidential
nomination. In so doing, he has pushed the Senate majority
leader, Bob Dole of Kansas, regarded as the front-runner for
the nomination, into supporting broad compensation measures,
which Mr. Dole earlier opposed as budget-busting.73
70. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 12.71. Margaret Kriz, Taking Issue, NAT'L J., June 1, 1996, at 1200,
1201.
72. Id.
73. Timothy Egan, Unlikely Alliances Attack Property Rights Measures:
Oppose Bills to Pay Owners for State Actions, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1995, at
Al. See also Allan Freedman, Dole Gambles on Legislation to Protect Property
Rights, CONG. Q, May 4, 1996, at 1215 ("Dole introduced the property
rights bill in March 1995. At the time, he faced a challenge from the
party's right wing in the presidential primaries. With a well-financed
Phil Gramm, R-Texas, knocking his conservative credentials, Dole
sought to shore up his base on the right.").
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Senator Gramm could not credibly contrast his more draconian
103rd Congress "compensation" measure with Senator Dole's
103rd Congress "assessment" measure when Senator Dole had
combined the two measures, along with a proposal by Senate Ju-
diciary Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and another by Senator
Richard C. Shelby (R-Ala.) and Don Nickles (R-Okla.), 74 into the
comprehensive S. 605. On April 6, 1995, Senator Gramm testified
in favor of S. 605 before the Senate Judiciary Committee: "I
think, except for the balanced-budget amendment to the Consti-
tution, that this bill is the most important thing that we are go-
ing to vote on this year . . . . "75 It was likely not a coincidence
that, while running against Senate majority leader Dole, Senator
Gramm pinpointed these two issues. The balanced-budget Consti-
tutional amendment had already failed in the Senate, and a fili-
buster threat and rising bipartisan opposition already had made
a Senate floor vote on S. 605 unlikely.
Senator Hatch's Judiciary Committee held hearings on S. 605
with an unequivocal tide, The Right to Own Property, which in-
cluded two days of Washington, D.C. hearings weighted toward
supporters and a separate day of hearings in Utah devoted exclu-
sively to boosters of the bill.76 Nevertheless, as evidenced by the
citations throughout this article, the hearings produced ample
testimony on the fatal flaws in S. 605. This testimony was consid-
erably supplemented by two days of parallel hearings entitled Pri-
vate Property Rights and Environmental Laws, that were held before
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 77
whose Chairman, John H. Chafee (R-R.I.) has long been a major
opponent of takings bills.
78
President Clinton criticized S. 605 and promised to veto it or
any similar legislation, in a December 13, 1995 letter to the Sen-
74. See 141 CONG. REc. S4492-01, S4497-98 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995).
75. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 7.
76. See id.
77. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32 (June 27, 1995 and July 12,
1995).
78. See, e.g., id. at 1-3; 140 CONG. REc. 55924 (daily ed. May 19,
1994); 137 CONG. REC. S7556-S7557 (daily ed. June 12, 1991); 136 CONG.
REc. S10,913-15 (daily ed. July 27, 1990); see also, e.g., Freedman, supra
note 73, at 1215 (" 'It is very severe on the environment,' said Senate
Environment and Public Works Chairman John H. Chafee, R-R.I., of S.
605. He added a word of advice for Dole: 'I would say: Don't get near
it. It's a loser.' ").
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ate Judiciary Committee: "S. 605 does not protect legitimate pri-
vate property rights. The bill instead creates a system of rewards
for the least responsible and potentially most dangerous uses of
property. It would effectively block implementation and enforce-
ment of existing laws protecting public health, safety, and the
environment. " 79
The Judiciary Committee approved S. 605 on December 21,
1995, by a 10-7 vote.80 Despite heavy pressure from Judiciary
Committee Chairman Hatch and Majority Leader Dole, however,
Senator Arlen Specter (R-Pa.) did not vote.81 During the Judici-
ary Committee hearings, Senator Mike DeWine (R-Ohio) had ex-
pressed serious doubts about S. 605.82 During the mark-up, Sena-
tor DeWine explained that "while I vote to report S. 605 out of
the Judiciary Committee today, I have serious reservations and
questions about certain aspects of this legislation. ''8 3 Senator
Howell Heflin (D-Ala.) orally raised similar concerns that the bill
needed a major rewrite8 4 before providing the only Democratic
vote in favor. Months later, Senator Heflin was reported to have
"said he continues to have concerns about the bill, including the
potential drain on the Treasury."8 5
79. Letter from President Bill Clinton to Orrin Hatch, Chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee (Dec. 13, 1995), quoted in S. REP. No.
104-239, at 55 (1996).
80. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 30-31.
81. See id.
82. Sen. DeWine stated that it was his "initial analysis that this will
be one more piece of legislation, one more law which will spawn a
great deal of more litigation, more work for lawyers, more work for bu-
reaucrats and ultimately, more power for Federal courts. That is my
problem with this bill . . . ." S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 246.
83. Written Statement of Sen. DeWine Regarding S. 605, the Om-
nibus Property Rights Act of 1995 (on file with the Fordham Envtl. L.J).
Specifically, Sen. DeWine stated that:
I am concerned that this bill could engender excessive litiga-
tion. I also want to be certain that we do not pass a bill that
undermines public health and safety. And I want to have a bet-
ter sense of the costs associated with this bill to local, state and
federal governments. Finally, I do have federalism issues that I
want to look at.
Id.
84. From the author's contemporaneous notes.
85. Freedman, supra note 73, at 1216.
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As Majority Leader, Senator Dole controlled the Floor Sched-
ule. Several Republican Senators, however, including John H.
Chafee (R-R.I.), James M. Jeffords (R-Vt.) and Judd Gregg (R-
N.H.), all "stated publicly their opposition to S. 605."86 Other Re-
publican Senators were strongly signaling private opposition or
their desire to avoid a vote.17
On April 29, 1996, Senator Dole cited S. 605 as a campaign is-
sue, stating that "we believe we will get that legislation passed...
. But President Clinton opposes it. . . .We want Senators and
House Members to vote on it so that you will know in the 1996
election where people stand on issues of importance to you."8 8
As a measure of the political support for takings, there is no evi-
dence that an emphasis on takings helped either Senator
Gramm's campaign, which was expensive, but short-lived,8 9 or
Senator Dole's unsuccessful effort to defeat President Clinton.90
Senator J. Bennett Johnston (D-La.), the leading Democratic
proponent of Sen Dole's separate, drastic, unsuccessful regula-
tory reform legislation,9' strongly opposed passage of S. 605. In a
86. See Lisa Caruso, Property Rights Legislation May Be Running Out of
Time This Year, CONG. GREEN SHEETS SPECIAL REP., Aug. 15, 1996, at 25.
87. See id. ("[A] nywhere from five to 15 Republicans are said to be
either opposed to [S. 1954, the successor bill] or undecided.").
88. Kriz, supra note 71, at 1200 (speech to the National Association
of Realtors).
89. See Bill Lambrecht, Bob Dole Embraces Pmperty Rights Issue, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 12, 1995, at 4B ("During the Republican pri-
mary campaign, Dole had little to say about property rights. The issue
belonged to Texas Sen. Phil Gramm, whose presidential quest crum-
bled early.").
90. See Freedman, supra note 73, at 1215.
While Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole's property rights bill
is energizing many core Republicans, it could tarnish his
standing among key swing voters worried about a potentially
harmful regulatory rollback.... David W. Almasi, a spokes-
man for Defenders of Property Rights .. .said that if Dole
backed away from a floor vote - given his command of the
Senate schedule - it would temper enthusiasm for his cam-
paign among many of his supporters.
Id.
91. See Caruso, supra note 86, at 25 (Sen J. Bennett Johnston wrote
to then-Majority leader Robert Dole (R-Kan.) in May that despite hav-
ing co-sponsored Dole's regulatory reform bill (S 343), he did not sup-
port S. 605.); Freedman, supra note 73, at 1215 ("LastJuly, Dole took a
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May 6, 1996 personal letter to Senator Dole, Senator Johnston
urged that the bill not be brought up:92
S. 605 is a radical departure from the original intent of the
Framers, over 200 years of constitutional jurisprudence, and our
ancient common law traditions. The notion that anyone has a
call upon the public treasury for a partial loss of the value of
his property because of a valid public welfare regulation ...
has never found a place in our laws or history.93
Meanwhile, a strong grassroots reaction against a wide range
of perceived Republican attacks on environmental protections
was growing. 94 While the scope of S. 605 extended far beyond
the environment, much of the debate focused on protections for
wetlands and endangered species that had been the core of the
House-passed bill.
However, a Congressional Research Service Report and Depart-
ment of Justice testimony detailed problems with S. 605 other
than its departure from Constitutional standards for triggering a
beating in the press for his failed efforts to push through a major regu-
latory overhaul bill (S. 343), and some in the party are nervous about a
rerun on a related issue.").
92. See Caruso, supra note 86, at 25 ('Johnston urged Dole not to
bring up the legislation at all, writing that 'S. 605 sweeps too broadly.
Its enactment wold be a terrible mistake. It does not merit the Senate's
consideration during the brief time remaining to us in the 104th
Congress.' ").
93. Letter from J. Bennett Johnston, Senate Comm. On Energy &
Nat. Resources, to Robert J. Dole, Senate Majority Leader 1 (May 6,
1996) (on file with the Fordham Envtl. L.J.). See also Senator Warns Dole
About Anti-Environmental 'Takings' Bill, NAT'L WILDLIFE ENVIROACTION,
June 1996, at 20.
94. SeeJessica Mathews, Earth First at the Polls, WASH. POST, Nov, 11,
1996, at A29.
Environment was the first issue to crack the lock-step Repub-
lican unity in the House, eventually provoking a rebellion by
some 60 moderates led by Rep. Sherwood Boehlert (R-N.Y.).
By early [1996], the tide began to move in the opposite di-
rection, eventually leading to the defeat of nearly all the
anti-environmental measures.
Id. This tide culminated in the 1996 general election, in which 16 of 19
defeated Republican incumbents - 85 percent - were on League of
Conservation Voters and Sierra Club lists of priority opponents (overall
only six percent of incumbents lost). See id.
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right to payment.95 One provision reallocated federal court juris-
diction to allow any Federal District Court or the Court of Fed-
eral Claims to either award payments or to invalidate challenged
agency actions.96 This could override preclusive review provisions
in many federal regulatory statutes. Preclusive review provisions
result in expeditious and uniform resolution of disputes over
new agency rules and orders. For example, the Clean Air Act re-
quires that challenges to regulations can only be decided in
cases filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
within 60 days of the Federal Register notice of the final rule.97
Another provision would have imposed an absolute ban on
agencies administering the Endangered Species Act or the wet-
lands program from entering onto private property to collect in-
formation unless the owner has consented in writing. 98 As the
Senate Judiciary Committee minority report on S. 605 stated,
"These provisions are made all the more indefensible, in our
view, in light of existing privacy protections, such as state trespass
law and the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures." 99 S. 605 could have barred even execution
of search warrants and court orders to determine whether ESA
or wetland violations have occurred.'0°
For those concerned about overreaching federal government
intrusions, there was also an ironic aspect to both this S. 605 pro-
vision and an amended Senate version. 10 1 As a practical matter,
95. See Memorandum from American Law Division, Congressional
Res. Serv., to Hon. Diane Feinstein (May 6, 1996) [hereinafter CRS
Memo] (on file with Fordham Envtl. LJ.); S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1,
at 389 (statement of John R. Schmidt, Associate Attorney General,
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice).
96. Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1995 § 205, S. 605, 104th
Cong. (1995). This provision was revived in 1997 as a separate House
bill, H.R. 992 and part of a Senate bill, S. 1256.
97. Clean Air Act § 307(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1970).
98. S. 605 § 504(a).
99. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 76.
100. See Robert Meltz, Am. L. Div., Property Rights: Comparison of
H.R. 9 as Passed and S. 605 as Reported (Cong.Res. Serv. No. 95-509A)
(visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www.cnie.org/nie/econ-10.html>.
101. See infra Part I.C.3. In response to criticisms, one of the revi-
sions Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen. Orrin G. Hatch described in
introducing S. 1954, "a new version" of S. 605 was to "amend the
owner's consent to enter land provision to allow for nonconsensual
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these provisions would have required a comprehensive, continu-
ally updated federal database of all owners of all potentially af-
fected property. Any effort to comply with their substantive
agency obligations would require immediate access to the ever-
changing web of corporate, partner, and individual owners from
whom consent would have been required.1°2
Other problems included requirements that federal agencies
"reduce takings of private property to the maximum extent pos-
sible within existing statutory requirements." 10 3 Apparently, this
could require drafting regulations and enforcing laws to avoid
any conceivable chance that a single taking (as redefined by the
bill) could result. This might be required even if it meant maxi-
mizing actual or threatened injuries to children's health, civil
rights, neighboring private property and a host of other values.
As long as the agency did not actually violate other laws, this
could mandate skewing against such other values the considera-
ble agency discretion that is possible under most laws.
Despite tentatively listing S. 605 on the floor schedule on sev-
eral occasions, however, Senator Dole never brought about what
he had said he wanted: a vote to mark out where Senators stood.
In mid-May, "Republican staff members announced they were
canceling plans to bring S. 605 to the Senate floor before the
Memorial Day break. The reason: The measure didn't have the
51 firm votes Dole needed to save face, let alone the 60 required
to break an expected Democratic filibuster."1°4
agency access to private land pursuant to criminal law enforcement and
emergency access exceptions." 142 CONG. REC. S7888 (daily ed. July 16,
1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
102. A similar result would be mandated under an approved Floor
amendment to the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997,
H.1R 1534. Section 5 of H.R. 1534 states:
Whenever a Federal agency takes an agency action limiting
the use of private property that may be affected by the
amendments made by this Act, the agency shall give notice
to the owners of that property explaining their rights under
such amendments and the procedures for obtaining compen-
sation that may be due to them under such amendments.
Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 1997, H.R. 1534, 105th
Cong. § 5 (1997), quoted in 143 CONG. REc. H8955 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1997) (statement of Rep. Traficant).
103. S. 605 § 404(b) (1). See also id. §§ 102(4), 503(a) (2).
104. Kriz, supra note 71, at 1200.
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Even House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) urged Senator
Dole to drop plans to call up S. 605.105 Then, on May 15, 1996,
Senator Dole further dismayed S. 605 supporters by announcing
that he was resigning from the Senate effective June 11, to run
for President full time.1 6
3. The Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996, S. 1954
On July 16, 1996, Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin
G. Hatch attempted to revive the issue by introducing S. 1954, a
slightly revised version of S. 605 that would have continued to
create a new, virtually unlimited corporate and individual entitle-
ment.10 7 At the end of the 104th Congress, despite a push for
new co-sponsors, S. 1954 had only 33 co-sponsors (the same
number as S. 605). As with S. 605, the only Democratic cospon-
sor of S. 1954 was Senator Howell Heflin. Senator Heflin was also
the only Democratic Senator in the author's detailed, contempo-
raneous vote counts who was likely to support either cloture on a
filibuster or the bill itself on the Senate Floor.
The new Majority Leader, Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.) was a
supporter of S. 1954, but, like his predecessor, he repeatedly
failed to schedule the bill for Floor debate and a vote. Strong bi-
partisan opposition to the new bill continued. This included a
105. Gingrich Urges GOP To Lower Profile on Regulatory Issues: Worried
About Environmental Image, Speaker Urges Dole to Back off from Broad 'Tak-
ings' Bilg CONG. Q. MONITOR, May 15, 1996, at 4 (Gingrich "specifically
urged Dole to dump plans to call up his broad property rights bill.").
Shortly before Gingrich's re-election by the House as Speaker,
Rep. Collin Peterson, D-Minn., a leader of the conservative
Democratic "Blue Dogs," told the American Farm Bureau
Federation that "If Newt Gingrich becomes speaker again,
we're going to have a much tougher time moving property
rights legislation . . .What happened in the end of this last
session, with the blessing of Newt Gingrich, was to empower
the people on the other side of this issue.., equal with peo-
ple who've been trying to straighten this out."
NAT'L J.'s CONG. DMLY/A.M., Jan. 7, 1997, at 3.
106. See Evette Reiss Davis, Dole's Departure Creates Uncertainty Over
Fate of Property Rights Bill, EESI WKLY. BULL., May 20, 1996, at 5 ("All
bets are off when and if S. 605, a comprehensive property rights bill,
will come to the floor.").
107. 142 CONG. REc. S7888 (daily ed. July 16, 1996).
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renewed promise of a filibuster by Senator Chafee, the Republi-
can Chairman of the Environment and Public Works
Committee. 08
In at least one respect, the scope of S. 1954 was actually ex-
panded in comparison to S. 605; the new entitlement would have
covered developers and other property owners who claim even a
temporary loss of part of the value of any part of their property.10°
Although the payment provisions of S. 1954 were limited from S.
605's "property" to "real property," S. 1954 defined "real prop-
erty" very broadly to include not only fixtures such as buildings
and machines; minerals, crops, oil and gas, coal, geothermal en-
ergy, and water rights; but also "contracts or other security inter-
ests in, or related to, real property."110 This latter provision was
broad enough to implicate regulations of the $1 trillion dollar
market in mortgage-backed securities."'
S. 1954, like S. 605, would have required an assessment of the
likelihood of a taking, as drastically redefined under the bill,
before agency actions or inactions that even temporarily affect
any kind of property. As the Senate Judiciary Committee minor-
ity report on S. 605 stated, the bill's application of this require-
ment to "even the most minor rules or policies, will hamstring
countless regulations necessary to protect our environment,
108. Anna Hebner, Property Rights Advocates Not Backing Down in
Push for Senate Vote, LEGI-SLATE NEws, July 23, 1996.
109. See S. 1954, 104th Cong. § 204(a)(2)(c) (1996).
110. S. 1954 § 203(5) (A) (vii).
111. See Fred B. Bosselman, Land As a Privileged Form of Property, in
TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AF-
TER LucAs 29, 40 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) [hereinafter TAKINGS:
LND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIoNS] (quoting Peter J. Culver, The Dawning
of Securitization, PROB. & PROPERTY. Mar./Apr. 1994, at 34, 36 (" 'the
mortgage-backed securities market has outstripped the corporate bond
market. Today, the total amount of outstanding mortgage-backed secur-
ities is more than $1 trillion, making residential mortgage loans the
most widely securitized financial asset.' ")). The author stressed this
point at the time. E.g., Hebner, supra note 108 ("Including 'security in-
terests' in real property could invite takings claims against any rule that
affects the trillion-dollar market in mortgage backed securities,
Sugameli suggested.").
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health or safety."11 2 According to both bills, prior assessments
would have been required even where the delay would result in
destruction of other private property or public resources, budget
impacts or threats to morality and other values. Even agency ac-
tions taken in health and safety emergencies would have re-
quired a post-agency action takings analysis.113
Senator Hatch's bill included a cosmetic change that raised
the threshold for payment from S. 605's 33-percent diminution
in value to a fifty percent diminution.1 1 4 This change was trivial
since the diminution threshold test still applied to any "portion"
of the property affected by the agency action, and in theory, any
agency action or regulation could be viewed as reducing the
value of some portion of any property by 100%.
Professor Carol Rose of Yale Law School testified that:
Once land can be apportioned into "relevant" portions, any
diminution can be manipulated to become a 100% diminution.
This effectively means that virtually any regulation with any ad-
verse impact on an owner's parcel could become an occasion
for compensation, without regard to the owner's expectations
and whether they were reasonable.115
As discussed below, the Supreme Court has recognized this in
repeatedly rejecting both any "affected portion" test and any per-
centage test for a taking.116 Indeed, the Federal Circuit rejected
an "affected portion" standard under which "protection of wet-
lands via a permit system would ipso facto, constitute a taking in
every case where [the Army Corps of Engineers] exercises its
statutory authority."117
Unlike S. 605, S. 1954 specifically excluded diminutions in
property value arising from civil rights statutes, including the
Americans with Disabilities Act.118 However, S. 1954 continued to
112. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 74 (discussing S. 605 § 403).
113. See S. 1954 § 403 (a) (2) (H).
114. See S. 1954 §§ 204(a) (2) (D), 508(a).
115. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 58 (minority views), quoting written
statement of Carol M. Rose, Apr. 6, 1995, at 12-13 (statement repro-
duced at S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 91). See also Rose, A Dozen
Propositions, supra note 30, at 290-91.
116. See infra Part II.A.
117. Tabb Lakes v. United States, 10 F3d 796, 802 (Fed. Cir. 1993),
cited in S. REP. No. 104-239, at 58 n.7 (minority views).
118. S. 1954, 104th Cong. § 602 (1996).
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apply to laws that protect children from having to drink polluted
water or breathe dirty air. Nor did it exclude laws that provide
for safe and humane work places and prevent destruction of wet-
lands that will result in flooding and other harm to neighboring
and downstream property.119 S. 1954 also failed to exclude the
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) 120 provi-
sion that protects homes, schools, churches, cemeteries and Na-
tional Parks from surface mining of coal.
Like S. 605, S. 1954 would have created a right to pollute and
a right to harm the property, health and safety of others. Both
bills basically provided that corporations and developers do not
have to obey laws that limit their ability to profit at the expense
of neighboring homeowners and the public unless they are paid
to comply. For example, as discussed below, these bills could
have forced Americans to choose between allowing the destruc-
tion of homes, National Parks and Native American burial,
archaeological and historic sites or paying mining companies not
to desecrate these sensitive areas. 1 2 Thus, S. 1954 would have still
required taxpayers to pay owners of real property to obey laws
that protect the health, safety and property of American citizens
and would have delayed the implementation of laws that affect
other kinds of property.
On September 6, 1996, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-
Miss.) decided against scheduling a Floor vote on takings, citing
119.
The clean air laws say that a polluter cannot use his property
to cause a child to get asthma. The occupational health stat-
utes say that an employer does not have a right to use his
property in a way that injures or kills his employees. The la-
bor laws say that an employer does not have the right to use
his property to exploit children. (Parenthetically, the oppo-
nents of child labor laws claimed they interfered with the
private property of the mill owners.) Wetland laws say you
cannot use your land to flood my land or lower the water ta-
ble and dry your neighbor's well. Many of the so-called prop-
erty rights bills disagree with this premise of our legal heri-
tage. Their premise is that a citizen must be paid not to use
his property in a way that injures his neighbor.
S. REP. No. 104-239, at 79 (Additional views of Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-
Vt.)).
120. SMCRA § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. 1272(e) (1994).
121. See infra Part III.C.
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the Senate's crowded legislative calendar and the lack of support.
"'When . . . [Lott] started doing some counting [of supporters],
some of the people that were thought to be "yeses" turned out
not to be so definite,' Nancie Marzulla, president of Defenders
of Property Rights, said after speaking with Lott. ' 122 Senator
Lott's abandonment of the bill reflected the bipartisan opposi-
tion to, and widespread concerns about, the merits and politics
of the bill. All indications are that proponents lacked even 51
votes on a potential procedural vote to end a promised biparti-
san filibuster (cloture requires 60 votes),123 Even fewer Senators
would have voted to pass the bill.
Harvard Law Professor Frank I. Michelman eloquently de-
scribed the horns of the dilemma facing proponents of the
House and Senate bills. First, there is no "remotely principled
basis" for the H.R. 925 approach of limiting the scope of protec-
tions to "land value losses stemming from agency actions under
two or three selected laws."124 Prominent ideological supporters
of federal takings bills agreed with this analysis.125
As Professor Michelman explained, however, extending the
bill's "protections to all property as affected by all regulation," as
S. 605 and the original version of H.R. 925 did,
122. Chuck McCutcheon et al., Lott Tells Lobbyists Property Right Bill
is Dead for This Year, CONG. Q. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1996, at 5.
123. See Caruso, supra note 86, at 25.
124. Michelman, supra note 2, at 416-17. Indeed, Congressional Re-
search Service reviews of takings cases involving claims against the fed-
eral government reveals that the vast majority of pending and recently
decided cases have nothing to do with environmental protection laws.
See Robert Meltz, Am. L. Div., The Property Rights Issue (Cong. Res. Serv.
No. 95-200 A, 1995) pt. 3 (visited Mar. 28, 1998) <http://www.cnie.org/
nie/econ-11.html>.
125. For example, Jonathan H. Adler of the Competitive Enter-
prise Institute testified that: "Any bill that seeks to protect the property
rights of Americans must cover all Federal laws that deprive land own-
ers of the reasonable use of their land. There is no principled basis
upon which to pick and choose which laws, environmental or other-
wise, should be covered." S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 222. He re-
peated this passage in subsequent testimony, but italicized "all" to em-
phasize the point. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 205. See also id. at 82
("There are a huge number of Federal regulations which have the ef-
fect of taking private property . . ... ") (statement of Nancie G.
Marzulla, President of Defenders of Property Rights).
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... stands no chance of enactment. No American Congress
would dare enact legislation that would openly, honestly, and
consistently carry out [the original version of] H.R. 925's pre-
tended high moral precept that government action should
never - ever - limit the use of private property so as in the
least to diminish its value, because the American public is no-
where near accepting any such precept and it never has
been."12
Thus, House proponents narrowed the takings bill, without
any principled basis, to certain laws. This revealed that the issue
was not property rights, but a Trojan Horse attack on laws that
supporters of H.R. 925 did not like. Under the guise of protect-
ing property rights, H.R. 925 would have made those laws too ex-
pensive to enforce. When Senate proponents extended their bills
to cover all laws (S. 605) or nearly all (S. 1954), the absurd and
draconian payments that would have resulted clearly revealed
that the purported property rights principles they embodied are
contrary to the Constitution's balanced approach and to the
views of the American public. 127
126. Michelman, supra note 2, at 417. In contrast, numerous states
have introduced, and some have enacted, takings bills, typically calling
for some version of assessment. The federal bills are far more draco-
nian than any state laws, however. For example, S. 1954 is more radical
than the takings bills that prompted bi-partisan vetoes in 1996 from
western governors (Gov. Philip E. Batt (R-Idaho) vetoed a takings bill
that was limited to billboards and Gov. Roy Romer (D-Colo.) vetoed a
takings assessment bill). For an overview of the property rights move-
ment in the states, see David Coursen, Property Rights Legislation: A Sur-
vey of Federal and State Assessment and Compensation Measures, 26 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envd. L. Inst.) 10,239 (1996); Robert Meltz, Prperty Rights' Laws
in the States, CRS Report for Congress, Dec. 2, 1996 (citing Larry Mo-
randi, Takings for Granted, 21 ST. LEGISLATURES 22 (June 1995); Ameri-
can Resources Info. Network, Summary of State Takings Legislation (vis-
ited Nov. 22, 1997) <http://www.arin.org/arin/states.html>; David
Thomas, The Illusory Restraints and Empty Promises of New Pmperty Protec-
tion Laws, 26 URB. L. 223 (1996)).
127. In an attempt to explain the Senate strategy, which he views
as politically counter-productive to the S. 605 sponsors, Professor Sax
has ventured:
this speculation: the constituency for compensation legisla-
tion has two main branches. One, represented by people like
[Rep.] Billy Tauzin [(R-La., formerly D-La.)], is primarily
concerned about what they perceive as excessive regulation
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II. PRECEDENTS
A. Constitutional Standards
Under the Supreme Court's analysis of takings issues, which
balances the property and other rights of all those affected,
there are several reasons why conservation laws will rarely, if
ever, constitute a taking.1 28 For example, threshold principles
state that: (1) takings are limited to actions that eliminate prop-
erty rights, as defined by wetlands, wildlife, public trust, federal
land law and other "background principles of property and nui-
sance law;"1 29 and (2) takings only can result from authorized
government actions. 130
Even if challenges to conservation laws passed this initial
threshold, a taking is unlikely under general takings principles.
Takings decisions must take into account several factors, includ-
ing whether there are reasonable investment-backed expectations
regarding use of the property. Therefore, it is not a taking to
regulate only part of the parcel as a whole, nor does prohibiting
only particular uses of land cause a taking. Consequently, takings
challenges to conservation laws have not been, and are unlikely
to be, successful. However, these radical attempts to rewrite the
constitutional standard through state and federal takings bills
could severely undermine laws that protect wetlands, natural re-
sources, and the health and safety of Americans.
under the wetlands and endangered species laws .... For
that constituency, property rights serves as a tool to cut back
on regulation in those areas. The other group consists of
those with an ideological concern about property rights, who
are no more troubled by uncompensated wetlands regulation
than they are about uncompensated zoning laws, or laws that
protect Americans with disabilities, laws that promote worker
safety, or regulate pension plans. My impression is that the
legislative proponents of property rights bills are reluctant or
politically unable to abandon this broader constituency.
Sax, supra note 55, at 518.
128. Wolf, supra note 19, at 637.
129. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1028-29 (1992).
130. See Tabb Lakes, Ltd. v. United States, 10 E3d 796, 802-03 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
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Indeed, Justice Holmes, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon1 31 -
the very opinion that created the concept of a regulatory taking
- warned that "[g] overnment hardly could go on if to some ex-
tent values incident to property could not be diminished without
paying for every such change in the general law... [SIome val-
ues are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power."132
For example, while ESA takings claims have not been, and are
unlikely to be, successful, they could, theoretically, have a detri-
mental impact on efforts to conserve and recover threatened and
endangered species. Takings cases do not just concern plaintiff
property owners and the municipal, state, or federal treasury; if
successful, the budgetary impact of these claims could have virtu-
ally the same practical effect as invalidating the law in question.
This effect can, in turn, have far-reaching impacts on public pol-
icy, potentially damaging the ability of government to enforce
other important protections of people and property, such as
public health and safety and civil rights, as well as the
environment.
As discussed herein, Committee hearings provided extensive,
irrefutable testimony and evidence that S. 605 employed a tak-
ings standard that is contrary to the Fifth Amendment as inter-
preted by unanimous rulings of the Supreme Court.133 Neverthe-
less, the Senate Judiciary Committee majority report on S. 605
claimed that the "most important function" of Tide II, the com-
pensation portion of the bill, "is to codify the substantive stan-
dards that apply to takings. 1' 34 Similarly, Senator Hatch ex-
plained his introduction of S. 1954, by claiming "that our critics'
real problem is not with the overall bill, but with the U.S. Su-
preme Court .... All we did in our bill was to codify the 'law of
the land.' The bill codifies and clarifies recent Supreme Court
standards as to what constitutes a 'taking' of private
property. ... 135
131. 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
132. Id. at 413.
133. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 86-102 (testimony and
statement of Prof. Carol M. Rose).
134. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 23.
135. 142 CONG. REc. S7888 (daily ed. July 16, 1996).
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Proposed takings payment bills, such as S. 605 and S. 1954,
would have created an unlimited new entitlement to those who
have not lost any property rights according to every Supreme
Court Justice. As more than 370 law professors wrote Congress
regarding the takings test in S. 605, "Not only has the [Supreme]
Court never adopted that radical view of the Fifth Amendment;
no single past or present Justice on the Court has."
136
That is not to say that the Supreme Court had not reached
the issue. For example, in 1993, the Supreme Court's Concrete
Pipe decision 137 unanimously reaffirmed the Court's long-standing
specific rejection of premises and standards at the heart of S. 605
and other takings bills.138 The Court ruled that regulatory takings
136. Letter from 371 law professors to U.S. Senators (May 2, 1996)
(on file with the Fordham Envtl. L.J.); accord Sax, supra note 55, at 515
("the standard they are advocating - a specified diminution of value
as the sole test of compensation - is one that every justice of the Su-
preme Court, conservative and liberal alike, over more than a century
has rejected as a standard."); S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32 (statement
of Richard Lazarus, Professor, Washington University School of Law at
168) ("In fact, no single Justice has ever embraced this view of the
Fifth Amendment.... This is constitutional cuckoo land.").
137. Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 642-46 (1993). The Court's unanimity on the tak-
ings issue is all the more remarkable given that several Justices con-
curred or dissented on other issues in the case.
138. The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report on S. 605
failed to cite Concrete Pipe, despite extensive discussion of the case in
the minority report. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 58 n.6 ("Nowhere does
the majority in its 74 footnotes mention Concrete Pipe. So we also recom-
mend: Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31 [and other cases]."). At least
one commentator has attempted to distinguish Concrete Pipe on the
ground that it was not a land use case. See Michael M. Berger, Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council: Yes, Virginia, There Can Be Partial Tak-
ings, in TAKINGS: LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, supra note 111, at 148,
161 (quoting Guimont v. City of Seattle, 896 P.2d 70, 79 n.10 (Wash.
App.), rev. denied, 127 Wash. 2d 1023 (1995)). Such efforts ignore the
fact that all of the cases specifically relied upon by the Concrete Pipe
Court in reaffirming the property as a whole doctrine (and in rejecting
any percentage test for a takings) were land use cases. See exchange
among the author, Roger Marzulla and Professor Sax on Concrete Pipe,
in 'Takings Rights" Debate, supra note 32, at 280-85. Moreover, Guimont
actually distinguished only the due process portion of Concrete Pipe, not
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decisions must consider many factors, including benefits to
neighboring homeowners and the public:
[O]ur cases have long established that mere diminution in the
value of property, however serious, is insufficient to demon-
strate a taking. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384
... (1926) (approximately 75% diminution in value);
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (92.5%
diminution) .139
Indeed, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council also recognized
that "It is true that in at least some cases the landowner with 95%
loss will get nothing, while the landowner with total loss will re-
cover in full." 140 This statement from Justice Scalia's majority
opinion for the Court in Lucas reaffirmed the Court's consistent
rejection of the approach of S. 605 and other takings bills that a
percentage reduction in value equals a taking.
Second, the Concrete Pipe Court reaffirmed that takings analysis
must focus on the overall property, not just the affected portion.
[Y]ears ago in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 130-31 . . . (1978), . . . we held that a claimant's
parcel of property could not first be divided into what was
taken and what was left for the purpose of demonstrating the
taking of the former to be complete and hence compensable. 141
Third, the Court reiterated the importance of a fact-specific
analysis that focuses on three factors: the nature of the govern-
mental action; the severity of the economic impact and the de-
the takings rulings. Federal and state courts have had no difficulty in
applying Concrete Pipe to land use cases. E.g., Tabb Lakes, 10 F.3d 796,
802 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 532-33
(Wis. 1996). Efforts to distinguish Concrete Pipe in the context of S. 605
are ironic for another reason: because S. 605 applied to every federal
law and all types of property, it would have applied to the specific facts
of the claim in Concrete Pipe.
139. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 645.
140. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 n.8 (1992).
141. Id. at 644. The "parcel-as-a-whole" principle is deeply and sol-
idly rooted in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Keystone Bituminous
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) (if segmentation
were allowed, "one could always argue that a setback ordinance requir-
ing that no structure be built within a certain distance from the prop-
erty line constitutes a taking"); Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 606 (1927)
(upholding "setback" regulation prohibiting development on part of
acreage).
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gree of interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions. 142 As part of the third factor, the Court focused in
rejecting the takings claim on a reiteration of the doctrine that
"those who do business in the regulated field cannot object if
the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments
to achieve the legislative end."143
In contrast, takings bills like S. 605 and S. 1954 require pay-
ments when there is: (1) a specific diminution in the value of
(2) any affected portion of property (3) without applying the
fact-specific factors. Because these bills ignore fact-specific ele-
ments, payments would be required regardless of whether, for
example, the claimant was in a highly regulated field or had any
reasonable investment-backed expectations that were denied.
This radical redefinition of property rights in proposed takings
bills typically fails to consider impacts on other people and prop-
erty, except for a wholly inadequate nuisance exception dis-
cussed below.144
Proponents of the bill145 and the Senate Judiciary Committee's
majority report on S. 605 erroneously claimed that "the Commit-
tee has also codified the 'affected portion' doctrine as articulated
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the [sic]
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States."1 46 In fact, Judge Plager's
opinion for the Federal Circuit in that case rejected the devel-
oper's argument that 11.5 acres, the area "for which the owner
seeks a permit" to fill wetlands, should be the relevant parcel. 47
Moreover, the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Do-
lan v. City of Tigardn " also applied a geographic parcel as a whole
analysis in determining that prohibition of development of the
floodplain portion of the property did not unlawfully deprive the
142. Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 642-45.
143. Id, at 645 (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84,
91 (1958)).
144. See infra Part II.B.
145. See, e.g., S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 45 (statement of
Roger Marzulla) ("The Federal circuit court of appeals has held in
Loveladies Harbor v. United States, a wetlands case, that it is only the
property which is affected by the regulation which is to be looked at in
determining whether a taking has occurred.").
146. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 24 (citing 28 F.3d 1171 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
147. Loveladies, 28 F.3d at 1181.
148. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
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petitioner of economically beneficial use of her land because she
was presently able to derive some economic use from the section
of her land unaffected by the regulation. 149 Thus, while the
Court questioned the requirement of public access to part of the
property, the Court affirmed that, in determining the impact of
a regulation on the economically beneficial use of property, the
portion that is required to be left undeveloped may not be seg-
mented from portions not affected.150
In the 1997 Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency case, Jus-
tice Scalia reaffirmed that the Supreme Court's Penn Central deci-
sion necessarily, and correctly, considered not only Grand Cen-
tral Station, but also adjacent and possibly nearby properties
where transferable development rights could be used as part of
the parcel a whole.
Penn Central... was applied to landowners who owned at least
eight nearby parcels, some immediately adjacent .... The rele-
vant land, it could be said, was the aggregation of the owners' par-
cels subject to the regulation (or at least the contiguous parcels), and
the use of that land, as a whole, had not been diminished.151
Therefore, S. 605, S. 1954, and other takings bills would force
taxpayers either to give up needed protections or to pay billions
of dollars to maintain health, safety and other measures that do
not take any property.
149. See id. at 385 n.6.
150. See id. at 387. But see id. at 400-01 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing the the Court's decision actually undercuts the nondivisibiity
principle in Penn Central). The Tenth Circuit subsequently interpreted
and applied this aspect of Dolan. In Clajon Prod. Corp. v. Petera, 70 E3d
1566, 1577 n.19 (10th Cir. 1995), the court noted that Dolan had
"clearly indicated that [the economically beneficial use] test must be
viewed in light of [plaintiffs'] entire property." See also Zealy v. City of
Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 530 (1996) ("the United States Supreme
Court has never endorsed a test that 'segments' a contiguous property
to determine the relevant parcel: rather, the Court has consistently
held that a landowner's property in such a case should be considered
as a whole.").
151. - U.S. -, 117 S. Ct. 1659, 1672 (1997) (Scalia, J. concurring)
(emphasis added). Justice Scalia was joined by Justices O'Connor and
Thomas. The remaining Justices joined in an opinion for the Court
that did not reach this issue.
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B. The Inadequate Nuisance Exception in Takings Bills
One of the ways in which many takings bills depart from the
constitutional standard is what Joseph L. Sax has termed an "ef-
fort to exalt nuisance into an all-embracing and exclusive de-
fense to compensation . . . the [Supreme] Court has expressly
rejected a takings standard that required a determination of
whether regulated activity was 'a nuisance according to the com-
mon law.' "152
Thus, takings bill proponents typically rely on a very narrow
exception in S. 605 and other takings bills for actions to prevent
a nuisance.15 3 Historically, however, nuisance (unwritten law de-
veloped by judges) did not prevent massive pollution and other
harms to people and property.154 As the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee minority report on S. 605 stated:
Indeed, when the Congress passed our landmark environ-
mental laws, it was with the full realization that State nuisance
law could not adequately or uniformly protect nearby landown-
ers or the community at large. For example, when Congress
was considering the Clean Air Act in 1970, it heard about a
rendering plant in Bishop, Maryland, whose emissions were do-
ing damage to the health and welfare of people nearby. Some
of the problems that the plant's neighbors were having in-
cluded nausea, vomiting, labored breathing and respiratory
problems. Not surprisingly, property values in the area were de-
pressed, and businesses stayed away. The report's conclusion:
152. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 178, citing Miller v. Schoene,
276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928).
153. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-239, at 28-30; 142 CONG. REc. S7888
(July 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch introducing S. 1954,
Omnibus Property Rights Act of 1996); S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at
25 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa)); 204, 209-11 (state-
ment of Jonathan H. Adler, Competitive Enterprise Institute); S. Hrg.
104-299, supra note 32, at 38, 103-05 (statement of Roger Pilon, Cato
Institute).
154. See Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a
Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analy-
sis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095, 1156 (1996) (noting standard of state action to
prevent harm to community under nuisance law is set down by courts,
not legislature, which accounts for the creation of environmental laws).
See also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 72 (2d ed. 1996).
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Bishop Processing Company's dry rendering plant has
had problems with malodors since it became operational in
1955. Officials from Delaware and Maryland recommended
corrections but all efforts to obtain abatement by local and state
officials through public nuisance laws have been fruitless. (S. Doc.
No. 63, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1679 (1970)) (emphasis added).
Similarly, in 1979, when the Senate was developing Federal
hazardous waste legislation, it heard testimony about 17 indus-
tries that were polluting the Warrior River in Alabama, and
damaging neighboring riparian owners. The person represent-
ing the owners testified that:
[t]here was every sort of polluter involved in that case,
just about. They continued to pollute. Why? Because we could
not find a successful vehicle under the common law, under nui-
sance law, that would adequately protect these individuals. (Haz-
ardous and Toxic Waste Disposal: Hearings before the Sub-
committees on Environmental Pollution and Resource
Protection of the Senate Committee on Environment and
Public Works, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Sept. 7, 1979, at 693)
(emphasis added). 155
Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Clean
Water Act's goals of efficiency and predictability would be under-
mined by applying the vague and uncertain nuisance laws of vari-
ous affected states to a source of pollution. 156 During the Senate
Environment and Public Works Committee Hearings, Senator Jo-
seph Lieberman (D-Conn.) vividly described the uncertainties re-
garding the reach of a particular State's nuisance law under S.
605 by quoting "Dean Prosser, who wrote one of the great trea-
tises on tort law, 'There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire [area of law than] . . . nuisance.' "157
During hearings on S. 605, expert testimony1 58 and testimony
from a representative of affected homeowners1 59 illustrated the
155. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 63 (1996); accord Sax, supra note 55, at
512.
156. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
157. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 7 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 86, at 616 (5th ed.
1984) (brackets added)).
158. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at. 180, 219 (statements of
Richard J. Lazarus, Professor, Washington University School of Law).
159. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 170 (statement of Merrily
Pierce, homeowner and vice president of the Fairfax County Federa-
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limitations of a nuisance exception by describing how, under a
1995 Fourth Circuit decision, pollution that reduces neighboring
property values may not be a nuisance in Virginia. 16° As detailed
in the testimony of Joseph L. Sax, Counselor to the Interior Sec-
retary, 1 61 and Associate Attorney General John R. Schmidt,162 nu-
merous cases illustrate how homeowners have been unable to
use common law nuisance to defend their property and fami-
lies.163 For example, it is not necessarily a nuisance in at least
some states to inflict a variety of harms upon homeowners and
the environment. In Pennsylvania, carcinogenic surface water
pollution that is a statutory violation may not be a nuisance.1t6 In
Maine, flooding neighboring homes by filling a wetland may not
be a nuisance. 165 In Massachusetts, contaminating and then sell-
ing private property may not be a nuisance.166
tion of Citizens Associations).
160. Adams v. Star Enter., 51 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
although a 300,000 gallon oil spill created an underground plume of
contaminated soil under a residential neighborhood resulting in a
marked decline in property values, it was not a nuisance because the
contamination was, at the time, imperceptible to human senses and,
therefore, was not an "unreasonable interference with the use and en-
joyment of property.").
161. See S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 79-87; S. Hrg. 104-535,
supra note 1, at 173, 178-79, 191-202.
162. See S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 71-72; S. Hrg. 104-535,
supra note 1, at 46.
163. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 178-79, 191-202; S. Hrg.
104-299, supra note 32, at 79-80.
164. See O'Leary v. Moyer's Landfill, Inc., 523 F. Supp. 642, 658
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that a landfill's repeated discharges of con-
taminated, carcinogenic liquids (leachate) into a navigable stream were
not shown to be a nuisance, but ordering the earliest possible "com-
plete and permanent containment of leachate generated by the land-
fill" based on violations of the Clean Water Act and the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act).
165. See Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698 (Me. 1978) (holding
that filling property and blocking water drainage is not a nuisance; a
plaintiff must prove that the defendant artificially stored and then dis-
charged water or established a water course - with a stream bed and
banks - onto the plaintiff's land.).
166. See Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F
Supp. 93 (D. Mass. 1990) (Mobil sold a site that it had heavily contami-
nated with toxic chemicals for over 60 years, which significantly im-
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Thus, pollution control and other laws were passed because
nuisance law proved extremely inadequate. 167 Reliance on nui-
sance law to counter the ill-effects of the new takings legislation
is either hypocritical or extremely naive. For example, nuisance
does not cover cumulative damage to health and property from
many sources. As Joseph L. Sax has written, "state nuisance law
does not provide anything like comprehensive protection even
from conventional pollution. Thus, the statement 'we're going to
be paying polluters not to pollute [under S. 605].' "16
The largely undefined and evolving scope of each State's un-
written nuisance law would create massive uncertainties for regu-
lated industries and protected citizens alike. National laws that
provide safeguards against national problems like air and water
pollution would vary from state to state; companies would have
to be paid to comply with laws in one state, but not in another
depending on how each State interprets the reach of its nuisance
law.169
paired the new owner's use and enjoyment of the land. Mobil was not
liable for remediation, however, because state nuisance law can only be
applied in conflicts between neighboring contemporaneous land uses).
See also, e.g,. American Glue & Resin, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc.,
835 E Supp. 36 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that a chemical spill and mi-
gration into groundwater and neighboring property was not a
nuisance).
167. See, e.g., John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and
the Takings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7 n.34 (1993).
168. Sax, supra note 55, at 513.
169. The uncertain scope of background principles of property
and nuisance law is an obstacle to every potentially successful takings
claim. Takings bills, however, massively magnify that uncertainty by ap-
plying it far beyond the narrow field of takings claims that satisfy the
numerous other requirements for a successful constitutional claim. For
example, takings bills would apply to cases where there was a: (1) tem-
porary denial of permission to fill in a (2) small wetland part of a con-
tiguous parcel that the purchaser had (3) no reasonable investment
backed expectations of being able to fill. The owner may have pur-
chased the parcel after negotiating the price down to reflect swamp-
land prices for the wetland portion. Moreover, the delay may have no
effect or even a positive effect on the value of the overall parcel. Any
one of these factors would preclude a constitutional takings claim, obvi-
ating the need to look at background principles such as whether the
developer had a right to increase pollution and flooding downstream.
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Thus, S. 605 would have created a right to pollute and a right
to discriminate unless taxpayers paid companies to comply with
anti-pollution and discrimination laws that go beyond the narrow
confines of state nuisance law.170 State nuisance laws simply do
not sufficiently or uniformly protect against complicated, broad
environmental, health and safety harms. As the Senate Judiciary
Committee minority report on S. 605 stated, in the view of the
bill's proponents, nuisance "seems to mean something like
'things that are bad' or 'actions which cause harm.'" 171 In fact,
however,
It is as true today as it was yesterday: State nuisance law cannot
adequately safeguard our environment, and it cannot see to it
that the health, safety and property values of neighboring land-
owners are protected. Furthermore, nuisance law does not even
address other vitally important public interests - like civil
rights protections, worker safety rules, and product safety guide-
lines. Discrimination may be shameful - but it is not a
"nuisance." 172
C. Political and Policy Considerations
As Professor John Martinez has pointed out:
By enlarging the scope of private property, takings statutes are
thus an attempt to indirectly amend every legislative enactment
which may affect private property - and it is hard to imagine a
statute which does not.... Takings statutes can affect all gov-
ernmental programs which might potentially affect private
property, including price controls, landlord-tenant relations,
zoning, building setback and height requirements, health and
safety regulations, and business regulation."173
The Senate Judiciary Committee minority report on S. 605 con-
cluded that: "The scope of the bill is itself breathtaking, as it
goes beyond mere land-use restrictions and covers environmen-
tal, public health, financial, safety, and civil rights regulations."17 4
170. State nuisance law normally covers only immediate and de-
monstrable harm that is substantial and cumulative. Additionally, state
laws differ and therefore environmental and public health and safety
protections would vary from state to state. See S. REP. No. 104-239 at 61.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 63-64.
173. John Martinez, Statutes Enacting Takings Law: Flying in the Face
of Uncertainty, 26 URB. LAw. 327, 339, 342 (1994).
174. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 60 (1996).
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The scope of the takings agenda has ignited broad opposition
on all levels of government, across political parties, and among a
broad range of groups. Opponents of takings bills include citi-
zens and groups representing civic associations, labor, taxpayer,
planning, historic preservation, public health, conservation, hunt-
ing, 175 "fishing industry organizations; state and local government
officials; and child welfare, civil rights, religious and senior citi-
zen groups." 176 These opponents, who are working to protect
people, property and natural resources, range from the League
of Women Voters177 to the United Steelworkers of America, 78
from conservative Christians1 79 to the American Public Health
Association.18 0
A broad range of religious denominations have opposed tak-
ings bills from a moral and theological perspective. These in-
clude detailed written testimony submitted by the United States
Catholic Conference; l8 1 statements submitted by the National
Council of Churches18 2 and by numerous Protestant denomina-
175. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 68.
176. Kriz, supra note 71, at 1201. "As a result, opposition to Dole's
property-rights legislation has grown in the Senate." Id.
177. See Dana B. Larsen, Building Broad-Based Coalitions to Oppose
Takings Legislation, in LET THE PEOPLE JUDGE: WISE USE AND THE PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 304, 309 (John D. Echeverria & Raymond
Booth Ely eds., 1995).
178. "Steve Francisco, legislative representative for the United
Steelworkers of America: 'This bill is really about opening the doors of
the public treasury to corporate special interests.' " Kriz, supra note 71,
at 1203.
179. See Michele Kay, Environmentalists Form Unlikely Relationships, J.
REc. (Okla. City), Aug. 12, 1994, available in 1994 WL 4764480. See also
infra Part III.D.
180. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 68 (1996).
181. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 154-158 (prepared state-
ment of Most Reverend John J. McRaith, on behalf of the U.S. Catholic
Conference). For an even more detailed discussion of this opposition
from a Catholic (and more generally a Christian) perspective, see
David E. DeCosse, Beyond Law and Economics: Theological Ethics and the
Regulatory Takings Debate, 23 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 829, 831 (1996)
("takings bills have as their premise notions of private property, the
state, and the common good which are sharply at odds with these con-
cepts as they appear in Catholic social teaching.").
182. See Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 41-42 (statement
of Rev. Joan Campbell, general secretary to National Council of
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tions;183 and opposition from a Jewish perspective.18 4 Religious
group representatives, including the Evangelical Environmental
Network, the Coalition on Environment and Jewish Life, the Na-
tional Council of Churches, and the U.S. Catholic Conference,
also opposed S. 1954 in a meeting with Majority Leader Lott's
staff.1 85
As stated above, President Clinton promised to veto the
House, Senate or any similar takings compensation bills and
strong bipartisan opposition repeatedly blocked Senate consider-
ation of takings legislation in 1996.186
A national poll showed that by a 53-35% majority, those who
voted for Republican candidates in 1994 rejected takings com-
pensation "if environmental laws restrict what they can do with
their land." 18 7 This result was confirmed by a July 1996 national
poll by Peter Hart and Republican pollster Vince Breglio, in
which citizens, by 52-38%, rejected takings compensation for wet-
lands and endangered species protections.
Voters have consistently and overwhelmingly rejected statewide
takings referenda. Every time voters have been faced with this is-
sue they have rejected takings. In November, 1995, Washington
State's Referendum 48 was rejected 60-40%, as was an Arizona
takings impact assessment bill in a November, 1994 statewide
Churches of Christ in the USA).
183. E.g., id. at 128-129 (statement submitted for the hearing by
the Lutheran Office for Governmental Affairs Evangelical Lutheran
Church in America). See also id. at 130 (statement submitted for the
hearing by Dr. Thom White Wolf Fassett, General Secretary of the Gen-
eral Board of Church and Society of the United Methodist Church),
131 (statement submitted for the hearing by Rev. Elenora Giddings
Ivory, Director of Washington Office Presbyterian Church USA), 132
(statement submitted for the hearing by the Peace Section Mennonite
Central Committee U.S.), 133 (statement submitted for the hearing by
Dr. Patrick W. Grace Conover, Policy Advocate Office for Church in So-
ciety United Church of Christ).
184. E.g., Letter from Rabbi Daniel Swartz, Director of Congres-
sional Relations, Religious Action of Reform Judaism, to Representa-
tive, United States House of Representatives (February 28, 1995) (on
file with the Fordham Envtl. L.J.).
185. Hebner, supra note 108.
186. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
187. Peter D. Hart Research (Dec. 1-4, 1994).
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vote.188 In Arizona and Washington, takings bill supporters out-
spent opponents by 2-to-1. In 1986, Rhode Island voters endorsed
a state constitutional amendment narrowing takings liability.189
Even prominent backers of takings bills recognize that they
dare not let the people vote. For example, Jonathan H. Adler of
the Competitive Enterprise Institute, in his July 12, 1995 testi-
mony in support of S. 605, cited public opinion polls that alleg-
edly showed popular support of compensation for regulatory tak-
ings.190 After the Washington state vote in November, the Seattle
Times reported that, "R.J. Smith of the conservative Competitive
Enterprise Institute, a Washington, D.C., think tank, said the
defeats in Washington and Arizona may have taught another les-
son: that property-rights leaders shouldn't take the issue directly
to voters through initiative or referendum." 191
Throughout the country, newspapers have almost unanimously
denounced proposed state and federal takings bills. Dozens of
newspaper editorial boards opposed takings bills in 1995 alone.192
188. Keith Bagwell, Property Rights Proposal Rejected By Wide Margin,
ARIZ. DAILY STAR, Nov. 9, 1994, at 13A (both referendums rejected by a
60-40% margin); Doug Conner, Property Vote Losers to Keep Fighting, LA
TiMEs, Nov. 9, 1995, at 35; see also Bruce Rushton & Heath Foster, Prop-
erty Rights Initiative Swamped/ Pmperty. 48 Boosters Blame the Weather, NEWS
TIB. (Tacoma, Wash.), Nov. 8, 1995, at Al; Dennis Wagner, 'War'In
Wings As Voters Reject Property Rights Issue, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Nov. 9,
1994, at A13 (opponents of takings bills outspent by 2-1).
189. The vote was 67.5% in favor of the amendment. See Memo-
randum from Michael Rubin, Assistant Attorney Gen. & Envtl. Advo-
cate, Dep't of the Attorney Gen., State of R.I. (June 1, 1995) (on file
with the Fordham Envtl. L.J).
190. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 221, citing "poll results per-
taining to property rights" in Brian Seashores, Are Property Rights Popu-
lar?, in PROPERTY RIGHTS READER 46-50 (J. Adler ed., Competitive Enter-
prise Inst., Jan. 1995). See also Adler's testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Committee on October 18, 1995, S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note
1, at 203, 249.
191. Eric Pryne & David Postman, Ref 48 Defeat Has Louder Echoes:
A Property Rights Stall in Congress, Too?, SEATrTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 1995, at
Al.
192. E.g., Common Sense and Property, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 1, 1995, at
24A; Deregulation Over the Edge, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 28, 1995, at
A6; Don't Be Taken by 'Takings, ROANOKE TIMEs (Va.), Mar. 1, 1995, at A-
8; Don't Toss Out Good with Bad By Stifling All Regulation; New House Bill
Would Undermine Safeguards, BUFFALO NEWS (N.Y.), Mar. 2, 1995, at B2;
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Representatives of state and local government have been major
opponents of federal takings bills. New Hampshire Republican
State Senator Richard Russman testified on behalf of the Na-
tional Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) against the
House and Senate bills.193 NCSL, the National Governors Associa-
tion, the National League of Cities, the U.S. Conference of May-
ors, the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, the Na-
tional Black Caucus of State Legislators, the International
Association of Fish and Wildlife Agencies, and the Western State
Land Commissioners Association all have approved resolutions
opposing takings payment bills for budgetary and other rea-
sons. 194 Also, thirty-three state Attorneys General wrote Congress
that: "[Takings bills] purport to implement constitutional prop-
erty rights protections, but in fact they promote a radical new
takings theory that would severely constrain the government's
ability to protect the environment and public health and
safety." 195
Academic experts on takings have offered detailed criticisms of
takings bills. Over 370 law professors wrote Congress that "S. 605
Environmental Reform Via Sledgehammer: GOP's Anti-Regulation Package in
the House Goes Too Far, LA TIMEs, Mar. 8, 1995, at 6; A Law That Would
Take the Public, CHIC. TRIB., Feb. 20, 1995, at 18; Let's Leave It to the
Courts to Settle 'Takings' Questions, DENVER POST, Feb. 20, 1995, at B07;
The 100 Day Hurricane, NY. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, at B6; Private and Public,
BANGOR DAiLY NEWS (Me.), Mar. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WL 5818849;
Second Take on Takings, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 9, 1995, at B6; 'Taking'
Liberties: Property Owners Have Responsibilities as Well as Rights, PrrrSBURGH
POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 10, 1995, at B2; Taking Wrong Turn: Compensation
Bills Would Clog Courts, Cost Taxpayers, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 26, 1995,
at 24; Tricking the Taxpayers: So Called 'Takings' Legislation Would Force the
Public to Pay Bribes, DES MOINES REG., May 15, 1995, at 10; The Twisted
"Takings" Bill, NEws & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Mar. 1, 1995, at A12;
Wrong Way on Takings, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 1995, at A20.
193. See S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 51, 117; Hearing: Private
Prope", supra note 58, at 73-78.
194. See NGA 1995 Annual Meeting Resolution 18; NCSL policy
resolution passed July 28, 1994; NLC Resolution #1 adopted Dec. 4,
1994; USCM Resolution Adopted Jun. 1995; NIMLO Resolution
adopted Apr. 8, 1995; NBCSL Resolution adopted Dec. 1995; IAFWA
Resolution adopted Mar. 1996; WSLCA Resolution adopted Jan. 12,
1995. The NLC, NCSL and WSLCA Resolutions are reproduced in
Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 69-72.
195. Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 64.
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would radically expand the government's compensation obliga-
tions beyond those required by the Fifth Amendment.... [and]
would impose an enormously burdensome and costly obstacle to
government action and undermine balanced efforts to protect
private property and the public welfare."196 Witnesses against the
Senate takings bills included some of the most prominent au-
thorities on takings. These included authors of two of the classic
articles on takings: Professor Joseph L. Sax (who testified in his
then capacity as Counselor to Interior Secretary Bruce Bab-
bitt),197 and Harvard Professor Frank I. Michelman;198 as well as
Yale Professor Carol M. Rose,199 Washington University Professor
Richard J. Lazarus, who "During the past 16 years, . .. partici-
pated in most of the Supreme Court cases involving takings chal-
lenges to environmental regulations,"2 and Georgetown Profes-
196. Letter from 371 law professors to U.S. Senators, May 2, 1996,
supra note 136; see also S. REP. No. 104-239, at 147 (1996).
197. Martinez, supra note 173, at 329 n.10, citing five "Classic anal-
yses of the takings problem," including Prof. Michelman's 1967 article,
infra note 198, and Joseph L. Sax's articles Takings, Private Property and
Public Rights, 81 YALE LJ. 149 (1971); and Takings and the Police Power, 74
YALE LJ. 36 (1964). Joseph L. Sax's articles also include: Property Rights
and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433 (1993); and Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REv.
279 (1986).
198. "Perhaps the best-known and mostcited article in this volu-
minous literature [on takings] is Frank Michelman, Property, Utility, and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 'Just Compensation" Law,
80 HARv. L. REv. 1165 (1967)." Carol M. Rose, "Takings" and the Practices
of Property: Property as Wealth, Property as "Property," in PROPERTY & PER-
SUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP
49, 66 n.1 (1994). See Frank I. Michelman, Testimony Before the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works, 49 WASH. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 1 (1996) (slightly edited version of prepared testimony); Richard A.
Epstein, Whose Democratic Vision of the Takings Clause? A Comment on
Frank Michelman's Testimony on Senate Bill 605, 49 WASH. J. URB. & CON-
TEMP. L. 17 (1996); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Response to Richard Ep-
stein, 49 WASH. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 25 (1996).
199. Some of Prof. Rose's most important articles are collected in
Carol M. Rose, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP (1994). See also Rose, A Dozen Propositions,
supra note 30.
200. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 215 (statement of Richard J.
Lazarus).
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sor J. Peter Byrne.20 1
III. CONSEQUENCES OF TAKINGS BiLas
A. Takings Bills Are Budget Busters
Proposed takings legislation would force repeal, or block im-
plementation, of basic protections for people, property, and nat-
ural resources by making them too expensive to enforce. The Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) concluded that the costs
of S. 605 would be "several times the $28 billion [over seven
years] of the House-passed legislation." 2°2
The Senate Judiciary Committee majority report on S. 605 er-
roneously claimed that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
"concluded that the cost of compensation to the Federal Govern-
ment under S. 605 would be no more than $30 to $40 million a
year, a tiny fraction of the OMB figure." 20 3 In fact, however, CBO
estimated only the costs of administering the bills, stating that:
CBO has no basis for estimating the additional amount of com-
pensation that the government might have to pay for cases
where property owners choose to pursue larger claims in court.
... CBO expects that the majority of the new suits would in-
volve relatively large claims against agencies that regulate the
use of land or water, particularly the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers and the Department of the Interior (DOI).
201. See Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 26-32. "In brief, I
believe that it would be difficult to denounce H.R. 9 with sufficient ve-
hemence. It is profoundly stupid and deeply cynical." Id. at 26. See gen-
erally Byrne, Ten Arguments, supra note 25.
202. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 142 (June 7, 1995 letter
from Alice M. Rivlin, Director, Office of Management and Budget to
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Sen-
ate), accord id. at 134-46, 181-83 (testimony and written statement of Al-
ice M. Rivlin).
203. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 26.
204. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 40, 43 (Congressional Budget Office
Cost Estimate, enclosure to March 8, 1996 letter from June E. O'Neill,
Director, CBO, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate). See also U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE,
COST ESTIMATE FOR S. 605, OMNIBUS PROPERTY RIGHTS ACT OF 1995 2
(Oct. 17, 1995), discussed in S. REP. No. 104-239, at 65 (minority views);
and Kriz, supra note 71, at 1203 ("the CBO ducked the question of
how much compensation the federal government would wind up pay-
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Taxpayers for Common Sense, a budget watchdog group, is-
sued a May, 1996 report stating that the cost of S. 605 could be
$100 billion over seven years, or, more likely, a virtual blank
check.20 5 Former Senator Paul Tsongas, a strong advocate of a
balanced budget, presented very powerful testimony on this issue
before the Senate Environment & Public Works Committee. 206
The Senate Judiciary Committee minority report on S. 605 cited
a study by the University of Washington Institute for Public Pol-
icy Management which revealed that Washington State's defeated
takings legislation (Referendum 48) could have cost local govern-
ments up to $1 billion annually for takings studies alone and ex-
posed them to payments of as much as $11 billion.207 As the au-
thor stated at the time, "The only limit to how much this bill
would cost taxpayers is any limitation on corporate greed and
ingenuity."20 8
Payment bills would thus block enforcement of environmental
and conservation laws as well as a wide variety of public health,
safety, financial,2°9 and civil rights laws.210 These bills would create
a new entitlement requiring blank check payments to corporate
and individual property owners. As a result, these bills would
compel avoidance of these costs through repeal or non enforce-
ing to aggrieved property owners.").
205. See Kriz, supra note 71, at 1203 ("Opponents of the Senate bill
assert that the full price could rise to $100 billion over seven years -
an estimate developed by Taxpayers for Common Sense, a Washington-
based public-interest group.").
206. See S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 146-51. The Senate Judi-
ciary Committee minority report noted that
Responding to the fiscal concerns voiced by former Senator
Tsongas, Senator Robert Dole last spring was quoted as say-
ing, 'I think he has raised some legitimate questions. Maybe
there is another way to do it. We are not trying to run up
the tab. We know one thing we can't do is spend a lot of
money.' (Boston Globe, Apr. 29, 1995, at 13)
SEN. REP. No. 104-239, at 65 n.13.
207. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 70 n.17 (citing INSTrruTE FOR PUB.
POL'Y MGMT., U. WASH., REFERENDUM 48 - ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY OF
THE PROPERTY RIGHTS INITIATVE (1995)).
208. Glenn Sugameli, National Wildlife Federation, quoted in Kriz,
supra note 71, at 1202.
209. S. REP. No. 104-239, at 211 n.9.
210. Id. at 124.
TAKINGS BILLS
ment of needed protections for people, neighboring property,
and public resources. The cost of takings studies mandated by as-
sessment bills would have a like effect.
If any such bills were to pass, the vast majority of payments
would be to large corporations and developers who are the sub-
ject of most of the regulations and who have the lawyers, apprais-
ers and experts necessary to demonstrate a right to payment
under the vague standards of these bills.211 This fact was dramati-
cally illustrated in May 1996, when an Exxon subsidiary filed a
lawsuit claiming that the $125 million Exxon Valdez tanker had
been taken.2 12 The claim challenged a provision of the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990, which was passed after the Exxon Valdez had
spilled 10.6 million gallons of crude oil, that allowed the ship to
operate anywhere in the world except Prince William Sound,
where the spill had occurred.2 13 Maritrans, Inc. subsequently filed
a takings claim for more than $200 million to cover the loss of
37 single-hull tank barges that would be forced from service in
2003 by the double-hull requirements of the same Act.214
Payments regarding land would also reflect the highly concen-
trated nature of land ownership:
211. In analyzing the results of S. 605, Senator Robert Dole's 1995
takings bill, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that "CBO ex-
pects that the majority of the new suits would involve relatively large
claims against agencies that regulate the use of land or water, particu-
larly the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Department of the In-
terior (DOI)." S. REP. No. 104-239, at 43 (Congressional Budget Office
Cost Estimate, enclosure to March 8, 1996 letter form June E. O'Neill,
Director, CBO, to Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate).
212. See James Gerstenzang, Tanker Seeks Return to Alaskan Waters,
LA TIMEs, May 4, 1996, at A16; David Whitney, Exxon Wants Notorious
Tanker Back on Duty in Alaska Waters, Anchorage Daily News, Apr. 5, 1996,
at A-1. See also Joan Claybrook (President of Public Citizen), "Takings"
Legislation Would Reward Polluters, S.F. EXAMINER, May 29, 1996, at A-17
(citing Exxon Valdez takings claim); Kriz, supra note 71, at 1202 ("for
the environmental lobbyists fighting the Republican property-rights leg-
islation, the lawsuit might just as well have come wrapped in pretty pa-
per and tied with a big bow.").
213. See 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (1994).
214. See Maritrans to Sue Over Spill Law Losses, J. CoM., Aug. 26,
1996, at lB.
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[I]f one combines the land holdings of the large farm opera-
tors and timber operators, 2.1 million land owners own 1,035
million acres of land. That means that 2.65 percent of all pri-
vate land owners own 78 percent of all private land. Their size
also implies a likely sophistication in dealing with government
programs. 215
In contrast, the roughly sixty million owners of residential prop-
erty own three percent of all private land.216 Takings bills would
benefit the former, large landowner group to the general detri-
ment of homeowners who depend upon clean air, safe drinking
water, zoning and other laws. In fact most home property values
benefit from land use regulations. 217
B. Takings Assessment Bills Would Needlessly Multiply Red Tape
From both legal and practical perspectives, there are numer-
ous fundamental flaws in takings impact assessments. Many tak-
ings bills track President Reagan's Executive Order 12,630, which
the Congressional Research Service and others have demon-
strated severely misrepresents Supreme Court takings law
precedent.218
In addition, many takings impact assessments are based on an
impossible premise - they purportedly would require a takings
determination - and typically a dollar assessment - at the time
any regulation is proposed.21 9 Such a requirement would conflict
215. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 205 (statement of C. Ford
Runge, Professor, Dept. of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Univ.
of Minn.).
216. See id.
217. See id. at 207-08.
218. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
219.
[A]ny determination that a regulation on its face (without its
application to a particular piece of property) causes a taking
is always impossible (with one exception - the legitimacy re-
view ... Only one level of analysis is possible to do by assess-
ment, that is the consideration of whether the regulation on
its face substantially advances a legitimate governmental in-
terest, the legitimacy review ... An assessment could not
make an intelligent conclusion for the following components
of the takings analysis. It could not (1) determine whether
permanent physical occupation is occasioned; (2) determine
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with the Supreme Court's consistent takings policy and experi-
ence. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that there cannot be
an inflexible test for takings because fairness requires case-by-
case judicial determinations.220 With the rare (and usually unsuc-
cessful) exception of facial takings challenges, '2 21 takings can only
be decided after a particular regulation has been applied to a
specific piece of property.222 This allows for consideration of the
individual and cumulative impacts of proposed uses on neighbor-
ing and downstream property and on the public.
In describing the takings assessment requirements of Executive
Order 12,630, Professor Carol M. Rose has stressed that:
A moment's reflection suggests how much these questions
will resist an ex ante investigation, and what special difficulties
they present for regulations with broad but mild impacts - the
very regulations that are often thought fairer that those that
single out particular owners. In such assessment requirements,
the detailed factual inquiries of takings jurisprudence simply
are shifted without being avoided, and indeed they are shifted
whether property would be partially or totally affected; (3)
conduct an economic impact analysis; (4) conduct the
'rough proportionality' test; (5) investigate investment-
backed expectations; or (6) strike a balance between public
need and the harm occasioned to specific property owners.
Robert H. Freilich & RoxAnne Doyle, Takings Legislation: Misguided and
Dangerous, LAND USE L., Oct. 1994, at 3, 4-6.
220. It is "a question of degree - and therefore cannot be dis-
posed of by general propositions." Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 416 (1922). The process relies on a ["factual inquiry into the
circumstances of each particular case." Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986); accord Concrete Pipe & Prods. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 643 (1993). See also
S. REP. No. 104-239, at 56 (minority views) ("Formulas, calculators and
financial appraisals cannot alone measure fairness, the Court has recog-
nized. Required, as well, is a look at all the relevant factors - such as
the owner's reasonable expectations in the property, the economic im-
pact of the government action on the property, and the importance of
the public interest being protected. See Penn Central Trans. v. New
York [City], 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978).").
221. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (1980).
222. See id.; see also MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm.
v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985).
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to a time frame in which they are less likely to yield reliable an-
swers. At best, such overblown procedural requirements are
simply wasteful and redundant, and at worst they are a kind of
harassment of regulators.223
Similarly, thirty-three State Attorneys General wrote Congress
that:
Takings Assessment proposals would require agencies to specu-
late about the precise amount by which the value of all affected
private property might be diminished, then speculate about
how much diminution in value would be caused by various al-
ternative courses of action, and then speculate about what the
courts might decide in any potential lawsuit challenging the
regulation. Since agency attorneys already review new proposals
for potential takings problems .. .this new paper-shuffling re-
quirement would do nothing to reduce the likelihood of un-
constitutional takings. 224
These State Attorneys General recognized that assessment bills
simply "creat[e] costly new bureaucratic paperwork requirements
with no corresponding benefits." 225 For example, under a 1992
Delaware takings impact assessment law,226 the State Attorney
General's Office conducted a "canned" regulatory review. This
review routinely noted that virtually all regulations involving real
property might result in a taking and that a more meaningful
analysis can only be done on a property-specific basis.227 The
then Deputy Attorney General of Maryland, Ralph S. Tyler, con-
cluded that the Delaware example underscores the "central con-
ceptual flaw" of a similar Maryland bill, that "it is impossible to
conduct a meaningful 'takings' analysis in the abstract ..."228
Even Roger Marzulla, who authored President Reagan's Execu-
tive Order on Takings which is the source of the concept of tak-
223. Rose, A Dozen Propositions, supra note 30, at 288.
224. Letter from 33 Attorneys General to Members of Congress,
Sept. 26, 1994, quoted in S. REP. No. 104-239, at 75 (minority views).
225. See id.
226. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 605 (Supp. 1996).
227. See Letter from Ralph S. Tyler, Deputy Attorney General of
Maryland, to Delegate Donald B. Elliot, Maryland House of Delegates 1
(Mar. 26, 1993). See Byrne, Ten Arguments, supra note 25, at 137 ("Thus,
in states that have adopted such prophylactic bills, the issuing agency
merely issues a circumlocution concluding that whether a taking will
occur depends on the facts.").
228. Id.
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ings assessment or "liability planning" bills, 229 admits that these
bills do not yield meaningful information about potential liabil-
ity. He and his wife, Nancie G. Marzulla, President and Chief Le-
gal Officer of Defenders of Property Rights, have recognized
that:
Planning bills do have a serious weakness, however. As Mary-
land [deputy] Attorney General Ralph S. Tyler points out, "no
meaningful analysis can be done" of the liability at stake in a
taking when so much depends not just "upon the particular cir-
cumstances" of the case, but on the philosophy of the particu-
lar judge hearing the case.... When judges take this ad hoc ap-
proach to takings law, liability planning becomes a shot in the
dark.2
While such efforts cannot yield any useful estimates of poten-
tial government liability or the number or cost of takings of pri-
vate property, they are not harmless. These efforts can incur
high costs in time, effort and expense and can function, inten-
tionally or not, to delay or block implementation of laws that
protect people, property and communities. 21 For example, as
discussed above, a study by the University of Washington Institute
for Public Policy Management revealed that Washington State's
defeated Referendum 48 could have cost local governments up
to $1 billion annually for takings studies alone. 232
Takings bills are back-door attacks on protections for property
and people that are too popular to modify or repeal on the mer-
its. The real purpose and effect of these bills is not to assess or
plan for takings liability but to increase profits by delaying or
blocking needed protections.
229. Roger Marzulla was Assistant Attorney General, Land and Nat-
ural Resources Division from 1987-1989, and is now Chairman of De-
fenders of Property Rights. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
230. Nancie G. Marzulla & Roger J. Marzulla, Legislative Solutions to
the Property Rights Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERN-
MENT TAKINGS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 174 (1997); see also
Nancie G. Marzulla, State Rights, supra note 18, at 107.
231. "Because the takings analysis could not be completed, assess-
ment type takings laws could not accomplish anything more than creat-
ing a huge expense and chilling the efforts of state agencies and local
governments charged to protect the health, safety, and welfare of our
communities." Freilich & Doyle, supra note 218, at 6.
232. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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C. Takings Bills Would Harm Private and Public Resources Alike
Takings compensation bills would force Americans to choose
between allowing destruction of homes and Native American
burial, archaeological and historic sites or paying companies not
to desecrate these sensitive areas. For example, S. 605 and S.
1954 could mandate taxpayer payments -to mining companies
and corporate developers in the following cases. In each case,
the court found that federal or state limitations on the use of
property to protect homes and burial, historical, and archaeo-
logical sites did not result in a "taking" of private property.
A company claimed a taking after two percent of a farm was des-
ignated unsuitable for strip mining under the Indiana version of
SMCRA. The site is eligible for the National Register of Historic
Places and is rich in historically and scientifically important
archaeological artifacts from four distinct cultural periods. The
Supreme Court of Indiana found that no taking had occurred
because "the overall effect on the value of the land is minute"
and only three percent of the coal was affected.3 3 The company
had bought the land with no expectation of coal mining and the
designation did not interfere with the original and present use
of the land for farming.
*The M & J Coal Company in West Virginia removed so much
coal from an underground mine that huge cracks opened on the
surface of the land, rupturing gas lines, collapsing a stretch of
highway, and destroying homes. When the federal Interior De-
partment required M & J Coal to reduce the amount of coal it
was mining to protect property and public safety, the company
sued. The court rejected M & J Coal's claim that, despite the
company's 34.5 % annual profit, mining regulations had "taken"
233. Department of Nat. Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, Inc.,
542 N.E.2d 1000, 1004 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1078 (1990).
The federal bills covered state administered federal programs, authoriz-
ing suit against the supervising federal agency. See S. 1954, 104th Cong.
§ 204(b) (1996); S. 605, 104th Cong. § 204(b) (1995). A similar state
bill could effectively reverse Hunziker v. State, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371
(Iowa 1994) (no taking from denial of mining that would violate Iowa
statute authorizing protection of human remains of national or state
significance), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1003 (1995).
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its property.23 4
S. 605, and S. 1954, could have reversed the results of these
cases. They would have ignored issues regarding the reasonable
expectations and profit from the overall properties. Payments
would have been required if there was a thirty-three percent (or
fifty percent under S. 1954) impact on the potential value of the
tiny "affected portion" of the Indiana property or of the coal
that had to be left under the West Virginia homes.
Takings bills can also harm public resources, especially when
there are claims of private interests.235 Private parties have unsuc-
cessfully claimed property rights in public lands under leases and
permits for extraction and grazing uses. 236 As Professor Richard J.
Lazarus testified:
[T]he property rights bills ignore the significant rights that the
public has to many natural resources, such as air, oceans, and
wildlife, that have long been considered not susceptible to pri-
vate ownership .... government must be able to protect the
public's rights to its natural resources. The government need
not allow individual property owners unilaterally to convert
public rights into private property."237
D. Health, Safety and Morality Consequences
Apart from strictly environmental concerns, takings bills such
as S. 605 could have required unlimited payments to importers
of assault rifles, effectively reversing the results of federal appel-
late decisions that found that restrictions on such imports did
not result in compensable takings..238 Indeed, this issue was raised
234. M & J Coal Co. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 360 (1994), affd,
47 F.3d 1148 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 53 (1995).
235. See National Ass'n of Homebuilders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041,
1052 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (value of endangered plants and animals as
sources of medicine and genes); EPA OFF. OF WATER, LIQUID ASSETS: A
SUMMERTIME PERSPECTrIVE ON THE IMPORTANCE OF CLEAN WATER TO THE
NATION'S ECONOMY 800-R-96-002 (May 1996).
236. E.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985); Freese v.
United States, 639 F.2d 754 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827 (1981).
237. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 218. See Rose, A Dozen Pro-
positions, supra note 30.
238. See Mitchell Arms, Inc. v. United States, 7 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (ban on importation of assault rifles did not take suspended im-
port permits; investment-backed reliance on government-issued permits
was not a compensable vested "property" interest: "as against reasona-
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during hearings on S. 605, when Associate Attorney General
John R. Schmidt referred in general terms to such cases in re-
sponse to an inquiry from Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-Cal.),
who mentioned that she was "intrigued by the fact that the Na-
tional Rifle Association is in support of this bill, and I would be
curious as to how this bill would affect weapons."239
The Judiciary Committee majority report tried to distinguish
the assault rifle case with a major non sequitur that focused on
how property rights under the Fifth Amendment (as opposed to
under S. 605) are "defined by the constitutionally allowable legal
constraints that exist at the time of acquisition of possession of
the property, even if the regulatory policy reduces the property
values of a general class of property holders." 240 Apparently rec-
ognizing how this language would result in a broad exemption,
the Report continued: "wetlands and endangered species land
use limitations in most cases do not fall in the preexisting law
category since takings arise in these circumstances from denial of
a permit after the property was purchased." l Unfortunately for
the authors of the majority report, this attempted distinction fails
- for example, in the assault rifle case, the alleged taking also
arose "from denial of a permit after the property was
purchased."
ble state regulation, no one has a legally protected right to use prop-
erty in a manner that is injurious to the safety of the general public.");
Gun South, Inc. v. Brady, 877 F2d 858 (11th Cir. 1989) (temporary sus-
pension on importation of firearms was not a taking because govern-
ment acted solely in its regulatory capacity); Fesjian v. Jefferson, 399
A.2d 861, 865 (D.C. 1979) (no taking from requirement that the owner
of a firearm not satisfying the statute's registration criteria "(1) 'peacea-
bly surrender' the firearm to the chief of police, (2) 'lawfully remove'
the firearm from the District for as long as he retains an interest in the
firearm, or (3) 'lawfully dispose' of his interest in the firearm." (Citing
D.C. CODE § 6-1820(c) (Supp. 1978)); see also Quilici v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1183-84 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (declining to
find a taking when "gun owners who wish to may sell or otherwise dis-
pose of their handguns outside" the town's lawful boundaries), aff'd,
695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
239. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 28 (citing Mitchell Arms, Inc.
v. United States, 7 F.3d 212 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
240. S. Rep. No. 104-139, at 27.
241. Id.
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Other, no doubt unintended, consequences of S. 605 could
have included, in effect, reversal of a decision that rejected a tak-
ings claim by a provider of "dial-a-porn" services, who challenged
federal regulations designed to protect children from obscene
speech.242 For state and local governments, enactment of takings
laws would have a host of disastrous consequences on local ef-
forts to protect people, property and communities.243 These bills
would require Americans either to pay for basic protections of
public safety and moral welfare or to allow a wide range of activi-
ties that harm neighbors and communities. Thus, takings bills
would mandate a prohibitively expensive, taxpayer-funded entitle-
ment for corporations and others that have not lost any property
rights.
Proposed state bills could reverse the results of cases where
courts have rejected takings claims brought by businesses faced
with limitations on their ability to exact every dollar of profit at
the expense of neighboring property and community values. For
example, these bills could require payments to unsuccessful tak-
ings claimants, including:
a tavern claiming that sobriety checkpoints to control drunk driv-
ing reduced their business;244
"to-go beer windows" challenging restrictions on drinking in
public;245
242. See S. REP. No. 104-239 (minority report), at 61 (citing Carlin
Communications, Inc. v. FC.C., 837 E2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988) (the Fed-
eral Communications Commission's provisions involving access codes,
scrambling, and credit card payment did not "take" private property)).
243.
Under this measure, a factory could be built beside a retire-
ment village, a massage parlor next to a church, or a night
club on a quiet residential street. One irresponsible devel-
oper could spoil a neighborhood and ruin property values of
its residents without fear of governmental interference. This,
apparently, is some legislators' idea of property rights.
Editorial, Legislature Should Quickly Kill Measure to Scrap Land-Use Con-
trols, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 9, 1993, at 6.
244. Get Away Club, Inc. v. Coleman, 969 F2d 664 (8th Cir. 1992)
(reducing drinking on premises furthers public goal of protecting
against drunk drivers).
245. Glasheen v. City of Austin, 840 F Supp. 62 (W.D. Tex. 1993)
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those denied a license to operate and all-night dance hall;24 and
proprietors facing restrictions on topless and exotic dancing.247
Donald E. Wildmon, President of the conservative American
Family Association, issued a press release condemning a Missis-
sippi takings bill as the "Porn Owners Relief Measure," citing
concerns that it would require payments if a law banned nude
dancing or made an "adult" business less valuable. 248 (The bill
would have required payments for state or local regulations that
cause a 40% reduction in property value).
The cases rejecting takings claims cited in this article are the
tip of the iceberg that would surface if takings bills such as S.
605 were passed. Already, litigants have demonstrated a willing-
ness to pursue through trial and appeals highly creative takings
challenges to a wide variety of local, state and federal protections
for people and property where established precedent is clear
that no taking has occurred. If a bill were enacted jettisoning
this established precedent in favor of a test tailor-made so claims
(restriction on consumption of alcohol "in or on" public streets and
sidewalks in designated areas of city does not constitute taking because
law was properly related to goal).
246. Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 E2d 667
(3d Cir. 1991) (denial of license for all-night dance hall supports public
interest).
247. See, e.g., Centerfold Club, Inc. v. City of St. Petersburg, 969 F
Supp. 1289, 1307-08 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (rejecting contention "that even
though beneficial use of the real property exists, a taking has nonethe-
less occurred because the landowner's chosen use of the property, i.e.
the adult establishment, may no longer be operated on the property);
J&B Social Club #1 v. City of Mobile, 966 F Supp. 1131, 1140 (S.D. Ala.
1996) (no taking because there was "no evidence whatsoever to indi-
cate that their property is no longer economically viable" as a result of
ordinance banning topless dancing in bars); Sammy's of Mobile, Ltd. v.
City of Mobile, 928 E Supp. 1116 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (ordinance banning
topless dancing in bars was not taking); Specialty Malls of Tampa, Inc.
v. City of Tampa, Florida, 916 F. Supp. 1222 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (zoning
changes alone are not automatic basis for successful takings claim by
an exotic dance establishment).
248. See American Family Association Release, Wildmon Blasts Pro-
erty Bill as "Porn Welfare" Scheme (Jan. 13, 1994) (on file with the Fordham
Envtl. L.J.).
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would succeed, the amount and nature of resulting claims would
only be virtually unrestricted.
Alternatively, enactment of takings bills can lead to a massive
chilling effect on promulgation and enforcement of any protec-
tive measures that may come within the scope of required pay-
ments. For example, there is already evidence that Florida's tak-
ings law, which requires payments for certain new restrictions
that "inordinately burden" land use, has had a chilling effect.249
249. See Editorial, Flawed Use of a Bad Act: Application of the Property
Rights Act Reveals Severe Problems, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB. MANATEE/AM,
Dec. 15, 1996, at 2F; Jerry Jackson, Poperty-Rights Law 1st Step for Farm-
e$, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 13, 1995, at 17; Editorial, Mangroves vs.
Property Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at 2D; Editorial, The
Property Appeasers, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 9, 1995, at 2D; Elizabeth
Willson, For a Better Environment: Nibbling at Growth Controls, ST. PETERS-
BURG TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996 at 1D ("It is causing cities and counties, large
and small, to give in to development demands of landowners."). House
of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Subcommittee Hearing on State Approaches to Protecting
Private Property Rights, Sept. 23, 1997 (Testimony of Jane Cameron
Hayman, Deputy General Counsel, Florida League of Cities) (visited
Mar. 9, 1998) <http://www.house.gov/judiciary/22350.htm>.
[In] Florida, the existence of private property laws has had a
chilling effect on the development of law, rules and regula-
tions. This effect means that existing laws, rules and regula-
tions move towards being frozen in place, because the ad-
ministrative structure is uncertain about the impact of the
private property rights laws, and finds it easier to do nothing
than to do something and find itself subject to the new law's
provisions. The impact of this is that the administrative struc-
ture may find itself unable to respond flexibly to new situa-
tions, conditions and technology and thus will become liter-
ally stuck.
Id. (Testimony of Harvey Jacobs, Dean, Department of Urban and Re-
gional Planning, University of Wisconsin-Madison, based upon "a re-
search project on the impact of state-based private property rights legis-
lation.") See also Nancy E. Stroud & Thomas G. Wright, Florida's Private
Property Rights Act: What Will It Mean for Florida's Future?, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 683, 685-86 (1996).
[I]ts impact on local government is likely to be quite severe.
The severity of the impact, however, will not be measured by
case law as much as by the unmeasurable, but real chilling
effect the Act will have on governmental regulation of land
1997] 579
580 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. VIII
Provisions in some takings bills that mandate that payments
will come out of the budget of the agency responsible for enforc-
ing the restriction can only magnify this effect. These provisions
provide a powerful incentive for agencies to grant permits that
will harm the health, safety and property of neighbors rather
than risk any conceivable chance that they will lose their jobs or
have to shut down to pay a judgment.250 In effect, "takings stat-
utes would give administrative agencies the power to nullify or
repeal regulatory statutes. The chilling effect of having a taking
award deducted from an agency's budget might prove a particu-
larly formidable disincentive to even the most dedicated public
administrator. "25l
The Fifth Amendment provides a delicate balance between
competing individual rights and between individuals and the wel-
fare of communities. Radical redefinitions of "takings" such as
the ones proposed in Congress last year disrupt this balance by
allowing uses of property that harm others.
E. Antidiscrimination Laws
The public accommodation provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964252 and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA)2 s3 were
use. In addition, the broad scope of the Act, the discretion
left to the courts under vaguely defined concepts, and the
prospects of significant monetary consequences, create a
strong incentive for government to compromise its regula-
tory authority for case by case settlements with complaining
property owners.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
250. See Dole, Clinton at Odds Over Devalued Land Issue, WASH. POST,
July 27, 1996, at E9.
'It would surely chill government regulators in their exercise
of regulatory authority,' UJerold Kayden, associate professor
of urban planning at Harvard University] said. Those regula-
tors would be worried not just about government funds, but
also about their own jobs, said Kayden, because the funds for
payments would come out of the enforcing agency's
appropriations.
Id.
251. Martinez, supra note 173, at 342.
252. §§ 201-07; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a - 2000a-6 (1994).
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needed precisely because discrimination was not a nuisance. Per-
haps most egregiously, therefore, takings bills such as S. 605
would create a right to discriminate.
In other words, S. 605 required that corporate and other prop-
erty owners be paid not to discriminate. This taxpayer obligation
would have arisen whenever a property owner could show that
complying with civil rights and ADA requirements partially re-
duced the value of a portion of their property.25 4
Essentially, S. 605 would have reversed the results of cases
which found that no "taking" of private property occurred from
Civil Rights Act and ADA prohibitions against discrimination by
hotels, restaurants and other public accommodations on the ba-
sis of race or disability. For example, a restaurant franchisee ar-
gued unsuccessfully that the requirement of the ADA that
restrooms be made accessible to people in wheelchairs was a tak-
ing, because it would require spending money and removing res-
taurant seating.255 Under S. 605, the lost seating (and/or the rest-
room) could be viewed as the "affected portion" of property
whose value had been reduced by more than one-third. 5 6
During the hearings on S. 605, Associate Attorney General
John R. Schmidt referenced this case in testifying about poten-
tially severe impacts of the bill on the ADA.25 7 In response, Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) stressed his
continuing support for the ADA and discounted these con-
cerns. 58 Eventually, when Senator Hatch introduced S. 1954, his
253. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
(1988).
254. S. REP. No. 104-239, 104th Cong. 60 (1996).
255. Pinnock v. International House of Pancakes Franchisee, 844 F.
Supp. 574 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
256. In discussing this case, the Wall St. Journal reported that:
"many lawyers say [the franchisee] probably would have prevailed
under some of the new takings theories being pushed in Congress."
Charles McCoy, The Push to Expand Property Rights Stirs Both Hopes and
Fears, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 1995, at Al.
257. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 10-13, 15.
258. See S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 13, 15-16.
Having been one of the authors of the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act and having managed the bill on the floor, I per-
sonally don't believe that this is going to cause any takings
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revised version of S. 605, he kept the original bill's heavy reliance
on the nuisance exception, but added one significant additional
exclusion - for civil rights laws, including the ADA. 5 9
At least some prominent proponents of takings bills, however,
have made clear their hostility to civil rights and ADA laws.
Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute was one of only six witnesses
called to testify in favor of H.R. 925 at the only House hearing
on the bill.260 Previously, he had written that anti-discrimination
restrictions on the sale or rental of private property
are illegitimate as a matter of right and hence should be abol-
ished .... We have no rights to preserve particular neighbor-
hood styles, for example, not unless we create those rights
through private covenants. Likewise with rent controls or an-
tidiscrimination measures: private individuals have a perfect
right to offer their properties for sale or rent to whomever they
choose at whatever prices they wish.26
problems at all to the Federal Government .... I don't think
the courts are going to interpret this law in that fashion to
do away with the ADA .... that is why we wrote the [one-
]third or more principle in this.
Id.
259. See 142 Cong. Rec. S7888 (July 16, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch).
260. See Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 4248.
261. Roger Pilon, Property Rights, Takivgs and A Free Society, 6 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 165, 188 (1983). Pilon's discussion of "rights to pre-
serve particular neighborhood styles . . . through private covenants" in
the context of his argument that antidiscrimination housing laws are il-
legitimate is especially jarring. Racially restrictive private covenants
were widely used to exclude persons of designated races from particu-
lar neighborhoods until the Supreme Court ruled that judicial enforce-
ment of restrictive covenants that were based upon race or color vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); see also Hearing: Property Rights,
supra note 58, at 41-42 (statement of Rev. Joan Campbell, general secre-
tary to National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, describing
the churches' earlier opposition to use of takings provisions that at-
tempted "to block racial inclusiveness. Allowing persons of color to live
next door, it was argued, would reduce the value of their white neigh-
bor's property and amount to 'taking' something away. Overlooked was
what racism 'took away' from its victims . . ."), quoted in HR. REP. No.
104-46, 104th Cong. 14 (dissenting views).
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In his testimony in favor of H.R. 925, Roger Pilon argued that
Congress should either repeal the ADA or pay affected busi-
nesses what he estimated would cost billions of dollars to comply
with it.262
Chicago Law Professor Richard A. Epstein declared, in his
1985 book Takings, that his "position invalidates much of the
twentieth century legislation" including: civil rights legislation,
the National Labor Relations Act, "The New Deal," Social Secur-
ity, minimum wages, and "virtually all public transfer and welfare
programs." 263 More recently, he has written that "I believe that
the billionth dollar spent on the recruitment and training of po-
lice, prosecutors, and judges yields a far higher social payoff than
the first dollar spent in the enforcement of the antidiscrimina-
tion laws. " 264
F. Litigation Explosion
S. 605 would have authorized cahallenges to a broad range of
federal actions or inactions on any property, including contract
262. Hearing: Property Rights, supra note 58, at 51-52.
263. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 281, 324 (1985). ProfessorJ. Peter Byrne states that
while Epstein is "both the ablest and most influential proponent of
constitutional property rights . . . [a] basic premise of Epstein's ap-
proach is a wide-ranging contempt for the political process," and notes
that "Epstein's book Takings, received an unusually thorough drubbing
from academic critics." Byrne, Ten Arguments, supra note 25, at 123 &
n.217 (citing Thomas A. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Pinci-
ple; Essay on Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain, 80
Nw. U.L REv. 1561, 1564-69 (1986); Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Con-
stitution, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 21 (1986); Mark Kelman, Taking Takings Se-
riously: An Essay for Centrists, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1829 (1986); Thomas Ross,
Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 1591 (1986); Joseph L. Sax,
Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 279 (1986)). See also ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICk THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 230 (1990)
("My difficulty is not tiat Epstein's constitution would repeal much of
the New Deal and the modern regulatory-welfare state but rather that
these conclusions are not plausibly related to the original understand-
ing of the takings clause."); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE NEW RIGHT AND
THE CONSTITUTION: TURNING BACK THE LEGAL CLOCK 98-136 (1990).
264. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 186-
87 (1995); see also RICHARD A- EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAwS (1992).
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rights and other intangibles.265 The result would have been a
flood of costly litigation.3 As Associate Attorney General John R
Schmidt testified regarding S. 605:
[W]e can rest assured that plaintiffs' lawyers will seek the
broadest possible application: compensation for businesses that
must comply with access requirements under the Americans
With Disabilities Act; compensation for a bank where federal
regulators determine that the bank is no longer solvent and ap-
points a receiver; compensation for corporations across the
country where Congress adjusts federal legislation designed to
stabilize and protect pension plans; compensation for virtually
any federal action that might affect the complex water rights
controversies in the West; compensation for agricultural inter-
ests that must comply with changing phytosanitary restrictions;
compensation where food safety rules or product labeling re-
quirements diminish the value of factories producing unsafe
products; and so forth. The examples are virtually endless.267
Looking at only the "affected portion" would magnify this ef-
fect. It would trigger claims whenever erosion or flooding con-
cerns affect one acre out of a 10,000 acre development which is
a streamside buffer or floodplain zone, 26 or whenever worker
265. See, e.g., Allen v. Wood, 970 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Wash.
1997) (rejection of inmate's mail under prison rules banning receipt of
contraband was not a taking, because "[p]laintiff fails to show that
property he was authorized to receive was taken for public use"). Ciga-
rette vending manufacturers have claimed that an FDA regulation re-
stricting cigarette vending machines to adult-only establishments consti-
tuted a taking of their machines, placement agreements and
commissions. See Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint at 5-6, A-1 Ciga-
rette Vending Inc. v. United States (Fed. Cl., Order to Show Cause Feb.
12, 1997) (No. 97-848 C).
266. See S. REP. No. 104-239, at 67-68 (minority views).
267. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 2, at 44 (statement of John R.
Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice),
quoted in Sax, Takings Legislation, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q at 517-18. See also
Martinez, supra note 173, at 339 ("By enlarging the scope of private
property, takings statutes are thus an attempt to indirectly amend every
legislative enactment which may affect private property - and it is
hard to imagine a statute which does not.").
268. Under S. 605's 33% of the affected portion standard, "Where
the affected portion . . . may be just a one-acre segment of a 100-acre
tract (and that is an example that was given during hearings on [H.R.
925] a similar bill in the House of Representatives), the portion on
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safety concerns affect one machine out of a thousand in a
factory.
Enactment of such a bill would also distort the economy and
investment. As Professor Richard J. Lazarus testified before the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee:
Perverse incentives will abound. Property owners will propose
activities not because of any real interest in their undertaking,
but rather simply so that the holder of the property right can
be denied permission and thus be entitled to compensation.
The law would create an economic incentive for land owners to
engage in the most environmentally destructive activities possi-
ble, short of a classic common law nuisance, in order to force
the land owner not to do so.269
Similarly, EPA Deputy General Counsel Gary S. Guzy repeat-
edly testified that S. 605 "will create perverse incentives that dis-
courage cooperation between property owners and regulators to
find ways of allowing development while protecting the environ-
ment. ... Even more perversely, the bill rewards proposals that
are not realistic or feasible." 270
Thus, for example, developers would apply for permits to fill
in especially sensitive lakes or other wetlands in order to collect
payments when the permits are denied. Logically, these applica-
tions would even be filed where the alleged development plan
would not make economic sense, as in cases where the overall
profit from the tract would be enhanced by retaining a lake and
marketing luxury upland lakefront acreage.
The Honorable James L. Oakes, a Second Circuit judge who
was appointed by President Nixon, has forcefully described the
litigation explosion that would have resulted from enactment of
the original version of H.R. 925 (Title IX of H.R. 9):
[T]he proposed legislation is so broad that the covered agency
action includes denial or conditioning of a permit and issuance
of a cease-and-desist order, as well as a statement under ESA
Section 7(b)(3) and commencement of a civil proceeding aris-
ing out of failure to secure a permit.
CERCLA lawyers who might be put out of business if
Superfund is repealed need not worry. They need only hope
question is1/3 of 1% of the whole." S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 2, at 176
(statement of Joseph L. Sax, Counselor to the Secretary, U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior).
269. S. Hrg. 104-299, supra note 32, at 220.
270. Id. at 200; see also S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 374.
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for passage of Title IX.... The possibilities are endless, mind-
blowing. Not only the national environmental movement but
much of local and regional land use planning is at risk with
proposed Title IX.271
During the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on S. 605, Jo-
seph L. Sax, Counselor to Interior Secretary, testified pithily that:
[A]nybody who thinks when you pass a law that says you can be
compensated by the Federal taxpayers when your property is re-
duced, any affected portion of your property, is reduced by 33
percent, thinks that isn't going to create a great burgeoning of
lawsuits must be smoking something pretty strong.272
CONCLUSION
Takings bills conflict in numerous respects with the Constitu-
tional principles that govern whether or not private property has
been taken. Ironically, some of these bills focus heavily on the
ESA and other federal and state species protection laws that are
extremely unlikely to result in a taking.
The property rights and values of American citizens are pro-
tected by environmental, conservation and other laws that pre-
vent harms to their private property, health, and natural re-
sources. Under the guise of protecting property rights, proposed
federal and state "takings" bills would radically redefine property
rights in a way that threatens these fundamental protections. By
establishing a takings standard that directly conflicts with Su-
preme Court holdings they would create a massive, unnecessary
new entitlement when, in fact, no property rights have been
taken. As a result, basic protections would neither be enforced
nor subsequently repealed.
The intended and unintended consequences of takings bills
pose a severe threat to conservation and protection of private
property, people, and the quality of the environment. The Na-
tional Wildlife Federation and others who support conservation
and the Constitution's balanced approach to takings oppose tak-
271. Hon. James L. Oakes, Developments in Environmental Law: What
to Watch, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,308, 10,310 (1995)
(speech to American Law Institute-American Bar Association, Feb. 15,
1995).
272. S. Hrg. 104-535, supra note 1, at 226.
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ings bills are the genuine private property protection movement,
not the self-styled "property rights" advocates.

